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Insurance(Third Set))Enriquez vs Sun Life Assurance Co

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  1.)Enriquez vs Sun Life Assurance Co. Of Canada 41 Phil 269 Facts:: On September 24, 1917, Joaquin Herrer made an application to Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity. Two days later, he paid P6,000 to the manager of the company's Manila office and was given a receipt. According to the provisional receipt, 3 things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there was a contract: (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant; (2) there had to be approval of the application by the head office of the company; and (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the company to the applicant. The head office at Montreal, Canada gave notice of acceptance by cable to Manila but this was not mailed. Thereafter, policy was issued at Montreal. Attorney Aurelio A. Torres wrote to the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application. The local office replied to Mr. Torres, stating that the policy had been issued, and called attention to the notification of November 26, 1917. In the morning of December 21, 1917, said policy was received by Mr. Torres but Mr. Herrer already died the previous day. Rafael Enriquez, was appointed as administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Herrer and filed to recover from Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity. The trial court favored Sun Life Insurance Issue: Whether or not Mr. Herrer received notice of acceptance of his application thereby perfecting his life annuity. Held: No. Judgment is reversed. An acceptance of an offer of insurance not actually or constructively communicated to the proposer does not make a contract. Only the mailing of acceptance, it has been said, completes the contract of insurance , Enriquez, as the appointed administrator of the estate of Mr. Herrer has the right to recover from Sun Life the sum of P6,000 with legal interest from November 20, 1918, until paid, without special finding as to costs in either instance. Art. 1319 of the civil code provides that Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer. Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into in the place where the offer was made. The contract was not perfected because it has not been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application ever came to the knowledge of the applicant. 2.)DBP vs CA 231 SCRA 370 Facts :  Juan B. Dans, together with his family applied for a loan of P500k with DBP. As principal mortgagor, Dans, then 76 years of age was advised by DBP to obtain a mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) with DBP MRI pool. A loan in the reduced amount was approved and released by DBP. From the proceeds of the loan, DBP deducted the payment for the MRI premium. The MRI premium of Dans, less the DBP service fee of 10%, was credited by DBP to the savings account of DBP MRI-Pool. Accordingly, the DBP MRI Pool was advised of the credit. Dans died of cardiac arrest. DBP MRI Pool notified DBP that Dans was not eligible for MRI coverage, being over the acceptance age limit of 60 years at the time of application. DBP apprised Candida Dans of the disapproval of her late husband MRI application. DBP offered to refund the premium which the deceased had paid, but Candida Dans refused to accept the same demanding payment of the face value of the MRI or an amount equivalent of the loan. She, likewise, refused to accept an ex gratia settlement which DBP later offered. Hence the case at bar.  Issue: Whether or not the DBP MRI Pool should   be held liable on the ground that the contract was already perfected? Held: No, it is not liable. The power to approve MRI application is lodged with the DBP MRI Pool. The pool, however, did not approve the application. There is also no showing that it accepted the sum which DBP credited to its account with full knowledge that it was payment for the premium. There was as a result no perfected contract of insurance, hence the DBP MRI Pool cannot be held liable on a contract that does not exist. In dealing with Dans, DBP was wearing 2 legal hats: the first as a lender and the second as an insurance agent. As an insurance agent, DBP made Dans go through the motion of applying for said insurance, thereby leading him and his family to believe that they had already fulfilled all the requirements for the MRI and that the issuance of their policy was forthcoming. DBP had full knowledge that the application was never going to be approved. The DBP is not authorized to accept applications for MRI when its clients are more than 60 years of age 3.) Virginia Perez vs CA 323 SCRA 613 Facts: Primitivo Perez had been insured with the BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation since 1980 for P20k. In October 1987, an agent of Lifeman, Rodolfo Lalog, visited Perez in Quezon and convinced him to apply for additional insurance coverage of P50k, to avail of the ongoing promotional discount of P400.00 if the premium were paid annually. Primitivo B. Perez accomplished an application form for the additional insurance coverage. Virginia A. Perez, his wife, paid P2,075.00 to Lalog. The receipt issued by Lalog indicated the amount received was a deposit. Unfortunately, Lalog lost the application form accomplished by Perez and so, he asked the latter to fill up another application form. Perez was made to undergo the required medical examination, which he passed. Lalog forwarded the application for additional insurance of Perez, together with all its supporting papers, to the office of BF Lifeman Insurance Corporationn in Quezon which office was supposed to forward the papers to the Manila office. Perez died while he was riding a banca which capsized during a storm. At the time of his death, his application papers for the additional insurance were still with the Quezon office. Lalog testified that when he went to follow up the papers, he found them still in the Quezon office and so he personally brought the papers to the Manila office of BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation. It was only on November 27, 1987 that said papers were received in Manila. Without knowing that Perez died on November 25, 1987, BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation approved the application and issued the corresponding policy for the P50k on December 2, 1987. Virginia went to Manila to claim the benefits under the insurance policies of the deceased. She was paid P40k under the first insurance policy for P20,000.00 (double indemnity in case of accident) but the insurance company refused to pay the claim under the additional policy coverage of P50k, the proceeds of which amount to P150k in view of a triple indemnity rider on the insurance policy. In its letter to Virginia A. Perez, the insurance company maintained that the insurance for P50k had not been perfected at the time of the death of Primitivo Perez. Consequently, the insurance company refunded the amount of P2,075.00 which Virginia Perez had paid. Lifeman filed for the rescission and the declaration of nullity. Perez, on the other hand, averred that the deceased had fulfilled all his prestations under the contract and all the elements of a valid contract are present. The trial court ruled in favor of Perez but appellate court reversed the same. Issue: Whether or not there was a perfected additional insurance contract.  Held:   No. The contract was not perfected .  Insurance is a contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, one party undertakes to compensate the other for loss on a specified subject by specified perils. A contract, on the other hand, is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other to give something or to render some service. Consent must be manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. When Primitivo filed an application for insurance, paid P2,075.00 and submitted the results of his medical examination, his application was subject to the acceptance of private respondent BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation. The perfection of the contract of insurance between the deceased and respondent corporation was further conditioned upon compliance with the following requisites stated in the application form which provides there shall be no contract of insurance unless and until a policy is issued on this application and that the said policy shall not take effect until the premium has been paid and the policy delivered to and accepted by me/us in person whi le I/We, am/are in good health”.   The assent of private respondent BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation therefore was not given when it merely received the application form and all the requisite supporting papers of the applicant. Its assent was given when it issues a corresponding policy to the applicant. Under the abovementioned provision, it is only when the applicant pays the premium and receives and accepts the policy while he is in good health that the contract of insurance is deemed to have been perfected. It is not disputed, however, that when Primitivo died on November 25, 1987, his application papers for additional insurance coverage were still with the branch office of respondent corporation in Gumaca and it was only two days later, or on November 27, 1987, when Lalog personally delivered the application papers to the head office in Manila. Consequently, there was absolutely no way the acceptance of the application could have been communicated to the applicant for the latter to accept inasmuch as the applicant at the time was already dead. 4.) Guingon vs Del Monte 20 SCRA 1043 (1967) Facts: Julio Aguilar owner and operator of several jeepneys insured them with Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. February 20, 1961: Along the intersection of Juan Luna and Moro streets, City of Manila, the jeepneys operated by Aguilar driven by Iluminado del Monte and Gervacio Guingon bumped and Guingon died some days after. Iluminado del Monte was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence and was penalized 4 months imprisonment . The heirs of Gervacio Guingon filed an action for damages praying that P82,771.80 be paid to them jointly and severally by the driver del Monte, owner and operator Aguilar, and the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. The trial court found Iluminado del Monte and Julio Aguilar jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of P8,572.95 as damages for the death of their father, plus P1,000.00 for attorney's fees plus costs. Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. is hereby sentenced to pay P5k plus P500 as attorney's fees and costs to be applied in partial satisfaction of the judgment rendered against Iluminado del Monte and Julio Aguilar in this case Issue: 1. Whether or not there is a stipulation pour autriu that will enable the heirs to sue against Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. 2. Whether or not the heirs can sue the insurer and insured jointly.   Held: 1. YES. The policy provides that the insurer agreed to indemnify the insured against all sums which the Insured shall become legally liable  to pay in respect of: a. death of or bodily injury to any person - indemnity against liability. Where the contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, then third persons to whom the insured is liable, CAN sue the insurer. Where the contract is for indemnity against actual loss or payment, then third persons CANNOT proceed against the insurer, the contract being solely to reimburse the insured for liability actually discharged by him thru payment to third persons, said third persons' recourse being thus limited to the insured alone. 2. YES. The policy expressly disallows suing the insurer as a co-defendant of the insured in a suit to determine the latter's liability. The No action clause in the policy which provides that suit and final  judgment be first obtained against the insured and that only thereafter can the person injured recover on the policy is of no avail because Sec. 5 of Rule 2 on Joinder of causes of action and Sec. 6 of Rule 3 on Permissive joinder of parties of the Rules of Court cannot be superseded, at least with respect to third persons not a party to the contract  , as herein, by a no action clause in the contract of insurance. 5.) Phil. Refining Co. v Palomar 148 SCRA 313(1987) Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 72498, 1 entitled Philippine Refining Company v. Hon. Enrico Palomar, finding that plaintiff-appellee's promotion schemes ( Breeze Easy Money and CAMIA Lucky-Key Hunt ) were not in the nature of a lottery and enjoining appellant from issuing a fraud order on the aforementioned schemes of appellee. It appears that the Philippine Refining Company, herein appellee, resorted to two schemes to promote the sale of its products: Breeze Easy Money and CAMIA Lucky-Key Hunt, both of which envisioned the giving away for free of certain prizes (without additional consideration) for the purchase of Breeze soap and CAMIA cooking oil. In other words, the participants would get the exact value of the price for the goods plus the chance of winning in the scheme. No one would be required to pay more than the usual price of the products. Issue: Whether or not the promotional schemes employed were in the nature of a lottery. Held: This Court has consistently ruled that a plan whereby prizes can be obtained without any additional consideration (when a product is purchased) is not a lottery. It is thus clear that the schemes in the case at bar are not lotteries. The allegation that the prohibition by the Postmaster General should have first been appealed to the Department Secretary concerned in view of the doctrine denominated as the exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application here because one recognized exception to the doctrine is when the issue raised is purely a legal one. In view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS this appeal and to AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of First Instance. 6.) Palomar vs CFI of Manila 165 SCRA 162 Facts: Sometime in August 1968, the private respondent started a sales promotion scheme designated as Grand Slam for its Breeze , Rinso , Lifebuoy and Lux products wherein any person who submits to it matching left and right halves of pictures of any article wins that article as his prize. Half-
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