Scott Gordon. The History and Philosophy of Social Science

of 199
All materials on our website are shared by users. If you have any questions about copyright issues, please report us to resolve them. We are always happy to assist you.
Related Documents
    ARISTOTLE ON THE VIRTUES OF SLAVES, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  by Kristen Anne Inglis May 2011   © 2011Kristen Anne Inglis   ARISTOTLE ON THE VIRTUES OF SLAVES, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN Kristen Anne Inglis Cornell University 2011 There is a puzzle about what Aristotle means when (e.g. at  Pol.  1.13) he attributes virtue of character to deliberatively imperfect persons like slaves, women, and children. This is  because his official ethical works (  EN  ,  EE  ) seem to insist that virtue requires the deliberative excellence of practical wisdom (  phronêsis ). If slaves, women, and children don’t have the virtue that Aristotle develops at length in the ethical works, then what exactly is the “virtue” that he ascribes to them? I argue that the virtue of slaves, women, and children, while not amounting to virtue strictly-speaking, approximates  such virtue in the following way (chapter 1). Start with the uncontroversial idea that virtue strictly-speaking, as a mode of rational excellence, essentially involves not only the excellence of an agent’s (strictly) rational or deliberative part, but also the excellence of her non-rational part—her alogon  or emotional part—  qua  that part’s ability to “follow” or “be persuaded by” reason. Now, while slaves, women, and children lack perfect deliberative faculties and so cannot have the deliberative excellence required for virtue strictly-speaking, they can at the very least have non-rational parts that follow reason in a way, and so can have virtue that approximates virtue strictly-speaking. Such obedience of the alogon consists, I argue, in the alogon  attaching to fine objects qua  fine (chapter 2). To support this claim, I look at what Aristotle says about   following reason. I then examine the motivational and evaluative capacities of non-rational desire and argue that appetite ( epithumia ) and spirited desire ( thumos ) can, if habituated properly, be motivated by considerations of the fine ( kalon ) as such (chapters 3 & 4). Granting that slaves, women, and children can have non-rational desires for fine action as such, can they decide on (  prohairesthai ) fine action? To answer this question, I argue for an account of decision whereby it essentially arises out of reflective deliberation about the constituents of happiness (chapters 5 &6). Because women can, but slaves and women cannot, engage in such deliberation, only women are capable of deciding on virtuous actions. The virtues of slaves and children do not include prohairetic motivation (chapter 7).


Nov 30, 2018


Nov 30, 2018
Related Search
We Need Your Support
Thank you for visiting our website and your interest in our free products and services. We are nonprofit website to share and download documents. To the running of this website, we need your help to support us.

Thanks to everyone for your continued support.

No, Thanks

We need your sign to support Project to invent "SMART AND CONTROLLABLE REFLECTIVE BALLOONS" to cover the Sun and Save Our Earth.

More details...

Sign Now!

We are very appreciated for your Prompt Action!