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Sticks and Carrots in Coercive Diplomacy: Toward a Theory of Inducements

Sticks and Carrots in Coercive Diplomacy: Toward a Theory of Inducements
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  The University of Chicago Sticks and Carrots in Coercive Diplomacy: Toward a Theory of Inducements by Eileen FilmusAugust 2015Faculty Advisor: John MearsheimerPreceptor: Milena Ang A paper submitted in partial fulÞllment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the Master of Arts Program in the Committee on International Relations   of 143  TABLE OF CONTENTS I.IntroductionÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 3II.Mechanics of the Stick-and-Carrot ApproachÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ. 6III.Literature ReviewÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ..ÉÉ 10IV.Theory; CounterargumentsÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 14V.Data and Methodology; Empirics TableÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ 23VI.Factors Affecting Success; Typology and Existing TheoriesÉÉÉÉ.ÉÉÉÉÉ.É..É 28VII. ConclusionÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.ÉÉ.ÉÉÉ.ÉÉ.É.É.ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ..ÉÉ 40VIII. BibliographyÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ.ÉÉ..ÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉÉ..É 41   of 243  INTRODUCTION ÒAnalysts refer frequently to ÔÔcarrots and sticksÕÕ as tools of international policy, but most of their attention is devoted to the latter. The use of military, economic, and diplomatic coercion is widely studied. The role of carrotsÑpolitical and economic inducements for cooperationÑis often a neglected stepchild.Ó The fact that scholarship on coercive diplomacy 12 has traditionally placed more emphasis on punishments and threats than on rewards and incentives has created a gap between our understanding of negative and positive inducements. 3 This gap has slowly narrowed as interest in the use of incentives to coerce international actors grows. But even though the relevant literature has advanced the study of these inducements in isolation, their combined useÑ the stick-and-carrot methodÑ remains undertheorized. Thus, 4 the question prompting this study is: what makes coercive diplomacy more likely to succeed? One potential answer is that the use of negative inducements alone is more likely to bring success, and a competing answer is that negative and positive inducements combined are David Cortright, The Price of Peace : Incentives and International Conßict Prevention, 5. 1  Coercive diplomacy is a speciÞc diplomatic strategy that employs the threat of force to make an 2 adversary stop short of a goal or reverse an action. The term coercion refers to the attempt to change an actorÕs behavior using no force or using limited force, which is also called demonstrative force. At the root of coercion is the  power to hurt  , the idea of holding violence in reserve by threatening pain, thereby manipulating the targetÕs cost-beneÞt calculus. Diplomacy is described by Thomas Schelling as bargaining for an outcome that is not optimal for either actor, but is better for both actors than other possible outcomes. In this extended bargaining process, policymakers use the strategy of coercive diplomacy to inßuence their counterparts when resolving disputes. ÒThanks to a vast and ever-growing body of literature on [negative] tools, policymakers have a 3 better sense of the best circumstances for using these ÒnegativeÓ instruments as well as the ideal means of managing their use. However, with a few notable exceptions, far less e ! ort has been devoted to discerning the most favorable circumstances and strategies for employing incentives or rewards, rather than penalties or punishments, to shape the conduct of problem regimes,Ó Haass and OÕSullivan, Honey and Vinegar,  1. The stick-and-carrot method is a coercive diplomacy strategy that uses a combination of positive 4 inducements (promises and rewards) and negative inducements (threats and punishments). of 343  more likely to bring success. The hypothesis I test here is that using both sticks and carrots makes success more likely than using sticks alone. The study tests this hypothesis across 24 instances of the United StatesÕ use of coercive diplomacy. It cross-correlates the use of the stick-and-carrot method with coercive diplomacy success, conÞrming the initial hypothesis and reinforcing the prior literature making this assertion.The paperÕs central argument that sticks and carrots are better than just sticks is not newÑ the literature review will demonstrate that scholars of coercive diplomacy have long suggested that sticks and carrots enhance effectiveness. However, only three studies (by David Cortright, Gitty Amini, and Dorussen/Mo) have actually tested this claim in a systematic 567 manner. As such, the argument merits further inquiry. Additionally, as the literature review will demonstrate, many studies theorize on the conditions favoring the success of coercive diplomacy or of positive and negative inducements in isolation. However they do this in a rather unmethodical manner, so I developed a typology that organizes and brings clarity to the series of factors that affect the success of the strategy of interest: the stick-and-carrot approach.This paper is therefore constructed around two elements: (1) it tests the hypothesis; comparing the effectiveness of sticks-plus-carrots versus sticks alone through a systematic medium-N study, and engaging with the argument theoretically by explaining the logic and addressing its counterarguments, the empirics and reasoning ultimately reinforcing the position that sticks and carrots are better than sticks alone. Cortright, The Price of Peace. 5  Gitty Amini,  A Larger Role for Positive Sanctions in Cases of Compellence? 6  Han Dorussen and Jongryn Mo, Mixing Carrots with Sticks. 7   of 443  But at this point in the analysis, a critical piece of the puzzle still remains: even if using sticks and carrots is statistically proven to be superior to using sticks alone, why does it not always  work? As Daniel Drezner writes, Òfrequently, however, carrots are spurnedÉ the existing literature on inducements is too small to be much of a guide for explanation,Ó so what explains the variation?(2) The second element aims at getting us closer to answering this question. It presents an exhaustive typology identifying the factors that help determine the outcome of the stick-and-carrot strategy as well as a brief review of competing claims about which are most consequential. I believe this is a contribution to the Þeld because it makes this aspect of the study of sticks and carrots more coherent.This structure parallels Art and CroninÕs reasoning in The United States and Coercive  Diplomacy wherein they provide a comprehensive answer to the question: what makes coercive diplomacy succeed? ÒWe have examined the prerequisites for (but not the guarantees of) success at coercive diplomacy; and we have reviews and coded WashingtonÕs most salient attempts at coercive diplomacy since 1990.Ó and then move on to say that Òwhat we have not explained is 8 why coercive diplomacy sometimes works and sometimes fails. To Þgure that out, we need to assess three additional factors to see if we can enhance our predictive capabilities.Ó 9 Similarly, I Þrst establish that sticks and carrots combined are more likely to lead to coercive success than sticks alone, and then I acknowledge that this does not explain why the stick-and-carrot method works in some cases but not others. In other words, the stick-and-carrot Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy  , 383. 8  Art and Cronin, 383. 9   of 543
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