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  American Political Thought and the American RevolutionAuthor(s): Louis HartzSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Jun., 1952), pp. 321-342Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950832 . Accessed: 28/04/2014 11:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at  . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp  . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.  .  American Political Science Association  is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Political Science Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.248.155.225 on Mon, 28 Apr 2014 11:10:19 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions   he merican olitical Science Review VOL. XLVI JUNE, 1952 NO. 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION LOUIS HARTZ Harvard University I The great advantage of the American, Tocqueville once wrote, is that he has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution. . . . I Fundamental as this insight is, we have not remembered Tocqueville for it, and the reason is rather difficult to ex- plain. Perhaps it is because, fearing revolution in the present, we like to think of it in the past, and we are reluctant to concede that its romance has been missing from our lives. Perhaps it is because the plain evidence of the American revolution of 1776, especially the evidence of its social impact that our newer historians have collected, has made the comment of Tocqueville seem thoroughly enigmatic. But in the last analysis, of course, the question of its validity is a question of perspective. Tocque- ville was writing with the great revolutions of Europe in mind, and from that point of view the outstanding thing about the American effort of 1776 was bound to be, not the freedom to which it led, but the estab- lished feudal structure it did not have to destroy. He was writing too, as no French liberal of the nineteenth century could fail to write, with the shattered hopes of the Enlightenment in mind. The American revo- lution had been one of the greatest of them all, a precedent constantly appealed to in 1793. In the age of Tocqueville there was ground enough for reconsidering the American image that the Jacobins had cherished. Even in the glorious days of the eighteenth century, when America suddenly became the revolutionary symbol of Western liberalism, it had not been easy to hide the free society with which it started. As a matter of fact, the liberals of Europe had themselves romanticized its social freedom, which put them in a rather odd position; for if Reynal was right in 1772, how could Condorcet be right in 1776? If America was I Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. F. Bowen (Boston, 1873), Vol. 2, p. 123. nb/. 321 This content downloaded from 128.248.155.225 on Mon, 28 Apr 2014 11:10:19 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  322 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW from the beginning a kind of idyllic state of nature, how could it sud- denly become a brilliant example of social emancipation? Two consola- tions were being extracted from a situation which could at best yield only one. But the mood of the Americans themselves, as they watched the excitement of Condorcet seize the Old World, is also very revealing. They did not respond in kind. They did not try to shatter the social structure of Europe in order to usher in a Tenth and Final Epoch in the history of man. Delighted as they were with the support that they re- ceived, they remained, with the exception of a few men like Paine and Barlow, curiously untouched by the crusading intensity we find in the French and the Russians at a later time. Warren G. Harding, arguing against the League of Nations, was able to point back at them and say, Mark you, they were not reforming the world. 2 And James Fenimore Cooper, a keener mind than Harding, generalized their behavior into a comment about America that America is only now beginning to under- stand: We are not a nation much addicted to the desire of proselytiz- ing. 3 There were, no doubt, several reasons for this. But clearly one of the most significant is the sense that the Americans had themselves of the liberal history out of which they came. Ih the midst of the Stamp Act struggle, young John Adams congratulated his colonial ancestors for turning their backs on Europe's class-ridden corporate society, for re- jecting the canon and feudal law. 4 The pervasiveness of Adams' senti- ment in American thought has often been discussed, but what is easily overlooked is the subtle way in which it corroded the spirit of the world crusader. For this was a pride of inheritance, not a pride of achieve- ment; and instead of being a message of hope for Europe, it came close to being a damning indictment of it. It saturated the American sense of mission, not with a Christian universalism, but with a curiously Hebraic kind of separatism. The two themes fought one another in the cosmo- politan mind of Jefferson, dividing him between a love of Europe and fear of its contamination ; but in the case of men like Adams and Gouverneur Morris, the second theme easily triumphed over the first. By the time the crusty Adams had gotten through talking to politicians abroad, he had buried the Enlightenment concept of an oppressed hu- manity so completely beneath the national concept of a New World that he was ready to predict a great and ultimate struggle between America's youth and Europe's decadence. As for Morris, our official ambassador 2 Rededicating America (Indianapolis, 1920), p. 137. 3 In J. L. Blau (ed.), Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy (New York, 1947), p. 58. 4 Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in John Adams, Works, ed. C. F. Adams (Boston, 1856), Vol. 3, pp. 447-465. This content downloaded from 128.248.155.225 on Mon, 28 Apr 2014 11:10:19 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions  AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 323 to France in 1789, he simply inverted the task of the Comintern agent. Instead of urging the French on to duplicate the American experience, he badgered them by pointing out that they could never succeed in doing so. They want an American constitution, he wrote contemptuously, without realizing they have no Americans to uphold it. ' Thus the fact that the Americans did not have to endure a demo- cratic revolution deeply conditioned their outlook on people elsewhere who did; and by helping to thwart the crusading spirit in them, it gave to the wild enthusiasms of Europe an appearance not only of analytic error but of unrequited love. Symbols of a world revolution, the Americans were not in truth world revolutionaries. There is no use complaining about the confusions implicit in this position, as Woodrow Wilson used to complain when he said that we had no business permitting the French to get the wrong impression about the American revolution. On both sides the reactions that arose were well-nigh inevitable. But one cannot help wondering about something else: the satisfying use to which our folklore has been able to put the incongruity of America's revolutionary role. For if the contamination that Jefferson feared, and that found its classic expression in Washington's Farewell Address, has been a part of the American myth, so has the round the world significance of the shots that were fired at Concord. We have been able to dream of ourselves as emancipators of the world at the very moment that we have withdrawn from it. We have been able to see ourselves as saviours at the very moment that we have been isolationists. Here, surely, is one of the great American luxuries that the twentieth century has destroyed. II When the Americans celebrated the uniqueness of their own society, they were on the track of a personal insight of the profoundest impor- tance. For the nonfeudal world in which they lived shaped every aspect of their social thought: it gave them a frame of mind that cannot be found anywhere else in the eighteenth century, or in the wider history of modern revolutions.6 5Quoted in D. Walther, Gouverneur Morris (New York and London, 1934), p. 76. 6 The term feudal, of course, has a technical reference to the medieval period. What Tocqueville and Adams largely had in mind, and what I refer to here, is the decadent feudalism of the later period-the corporate society of Europe, as some historians of the eighteenth century have put it. It has often been noted that the nonexistence of a feudal tradition-save for scattered remnants of which most, to be sure, were abolished by the American revolution-has been the great distinguishing feature of American civilization. But no interpretation of American politics or American political thought has as yet been inspired by this observation. It is obvious that the development of liberalism without feudalism, the development of Locke, as it were, without the antagonism of Filmer This content downloaded from 128.248.155.225 on Mon, 28 Apr 2014 11:10:19 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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