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  Custodio vs. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 483, February 9, 1996 Regalado, J.: FACTS:  Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos.  As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the public street. Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:  Whether or not the award of damages is proper? HELD:  No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to  morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedg es, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”   At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.  Valley Golf & Country Club vs. Vda de Caram 542 SCRA 218, April 16, 2009 Tinga, J.: FACTS: Petitioner is a duly constituted non-stock, non-profit corporation which operates a golf course. The members and their guests are entitled to play golf on the said course and avail of the facilities and privilege. The shareholders are likewise assessed monthly membership dues.   Cong. Fermin Z. Caram, Jr., respondent’s husband, subscribed and paid in full 1 Golf Share of the petitioner and was subsequently issued with a stock certificate which indicated a par value of P9,000.00. It was alleged by the petitioner that Caram stopped paying his monthly dues and that it has sent 5 letters to Caram concerning his delinquent account. The Golf Share was subsequently sold at public auction for P25,000.00 after the BOD had authorized the sale and the Notice of Auction Sale was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Caram thereafter died and his wife initiated intestate proceedings before the RTC of IloIlo. Unaware of the pending controversy over the Golf Share, the Caram family and the RTC included the Golf Share as part of Caram’s  estate. The RTC approved a project of partition of Caram’s  estate and the Golf Share was adjudicated to the wife, who paid the corresponding estate tax due, including that on the golf Share. It was only through a letter that the heirs of Caram learned of the sale of the Golf Share following their inquiry with Valley Golf about the Golf Share. After a series of correspondence, the Caram heirs were subsequently informed in a letter that they were entitled to the refund of P11,066.52 out of the proceeds of the sale of the Golf Share, which amount had been in the custody of the petitioner. Caram’s  wife filed an action for reconveyance of the Golf Share with damages before the SEC against Valley Golf. The SEC Hearing Officer rendered a decision in favor of the wife, ordering Valley Golf to convey ownership of the Golf Share, or in the alternative. to issue one fully paid share of stock of Valley Golf of the same class as the Golf Share to the wife. Damages totaling P90,000.00 were also awarded to the wife. The SEC hearing officer ruled that under Section 67, paragraph 2 of the Corporation Code, a share stock could only be deemed delinquent and sold in an extrajudicial sale at public auction only upon the failure of the stockholder to pay the unpaid subscription or balance for the share. However, the section could not have applied in Caram’s  case since he had fully paid for the Golf Share and he had been assessed not for the share itself but for his delinquent club dues. Proceeding from the foregoing premises, the SEC hearing officer concluded that the auction sale had no basis in law and was thus a nullity. The SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals affirmed the hearin g officer’s decision, and so the petitioner appealed before SC. ISSUE: Whether or not a non-stock corporation seize and dispose of the membership share of a fully-paid member on account of its unpaid debts to the corporation when it is authorized to do so under the corporate by-laws but not by the Articles of Incorporation?    HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there is a specific provision under Title XI on Non-Stock Corporations of the Corporation Code dealing with the termination of membership in a non-stock corporation such as Valley Golf. Section 91 of the Corporation Code provides: SEC. 91. Termination of membership. — Membership shall be terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. Termination of membership shall have the effect of extinguishing all rights of a member in the corporation or in its property, unless otherwise  provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws.  A share can only be deemed delinquent and sold at public auction only upon the failure of the stockholder to pay the unpaid subscription. Delinquency in monthly club dues was merely an ordinary debt enforceable by judicial action in a civil case. A provision creating a lien upon shares of stock for unpaid debts, liabilities, or assessments of stockholders to the corporation, should be embodied in the  Articles of Incorporation, and not merely in the by-laws. Moreover, the by-laws of petitioner should have provided formal notice and hearing procedure before a member’s share may be seized and sold.   The procedure for stock corporation’s recourse on unpaid subscription is not applicable in member’s shares in a non-stock corporation. SC proceeded to declare the sale as invalid. SC found that Valley Golf acted in bad faith when it sent the final notice to Caram under the pretense they believed him to be still alive, when in fact they had very well known that he had already died. The Court stated: Whatever the reason Caram was unable to respond to the earlier notices, the fact remains that at the time of the final notice, Valley Golf knew that Caram, having died and gone, would not be able to settle the obligation himself, yet they persisted in sending him notice to provide a color of regularity to the resulting sale. That reason alone, evocative as it is of the absence of substantial justice in the sale of the Golf Share, is sufficient to nullify the sale and sustain the rulings of the SEC and the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the utter and appalling bad faith exhibited by Valley Golf in sending out the final notice to Caram on the deliberate pretense that he was still alive could bring into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 under the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code. These provisions enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. Non-stock corporations and its officers are not exempt from that obligation.

yr 7 football v3

Sep 22, 2019

yr 7 football v3

Sep 22, 2019
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