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     SECTION 1- DUE PROCESS OF LAW ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. Facts: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:   (1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and (2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:    It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.    The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.    The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. Issue/s:  Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. Discussions: A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Ruling/s : Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection c lause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such clas s and those who do not.”  PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES [231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994] Facts:  Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.  Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process. Held:  There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor. G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. Facts:  On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate  Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. Issue:  Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional? Ruling:  The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.  Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr. G.R. No. 131652 & 131728,287 SCRA 245, March 9, 1998 FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition for a change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the pendency of such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of desistance. The court granted the change of venue. Public respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted bail. They pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua . Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.   ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.  RULING: YES. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right sho uld not be so construed  as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified. Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require: (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upo n inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”   ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994] Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that “gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.  G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the  jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC Issue:  Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional. Held : In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent  Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing. The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner. Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940 Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU. The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.  ISSUE:  Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial. HELD:  Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing). The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:    The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.    Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.


Sep 22, 2019

ASTM A297-1998

Sep 22, 2019
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