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  1 Lecture Three: Democracy Challenged by Carlyle (in Past and Present   (Chapter XI: “Democracy”) and Taught by John Stuart ill (in “!entham # Coleridge and  On Liberty   $ chapter% II and III %ee al%o Contributions I# &&$&'): The a%%age rom Tantrum to Deliberati*e ro%e in the +ictorian ,%%ay- under%tanding the ne. liberal paradigm a% a conception .ith rational principle% and practice% ( Contributions I# '/$'0 and '1$'2) (c)3e=gbs!to!r& d=#$%=oep ge&'&(=( lse *to see C rl+le,s portr it-1. P rt hree o( ho s C rl+le,s P st d Preset *10- tre ts deor + s  o+ig obet o( derisio *op re this p ss ge 3ith Sartor Resartus 4 5he E%erl stig e 7- d pre hes iste d the uthorit ri  rule b+ the eritor + 'You cannot walk the streets without beholding Democracy announceitself: the very Tailor has become, if not properly Sansculottic,which to him would be ruinous, yet a Tailor unconsciously symbolising,and prophesying with his scissors, the reign of Euality! hat now isour fashionable coat# Carlyle deconstructs (dismantles with a critical eye, in order to reconstruct on another level) the notion of democracy. It is defined as  'the liberty of not being oppressed by your fellow man$! Carlyle considers it “ an indispensable, yet one of the most insignificant fractionalparts of %uman &iberty! Carlyle considers that man is enthralled by “his own brutal appetites”: Thou art the thrall not of (edric the Sa)on, but of thy own brutal appetites and this scoured dish of liuor! *nd thou pratest of thy 'liberty'# Thou entire blockhead+%eavy-wet and gin: alas, these are not the only kinds of thraldom!./0 thou art1 as an 'enchanted *pe' under 2od's sky, where thou mightest have been a man, had proper Schoolmasters and (onuerors, and (onstables with cat-o'-nine tails,been vouchsafed thee3&iberty# The true liberty of a man, you would say, consisted in hisfinding out, or being forced to find out the right path, and to walkthereon! To learn, or to be taught, what work he actually was ablefor3 and then by permission, persuasion, and even compulsion, to setabout doing of the same+ That is his true blessedness, honour,'liberty' and ma)imum of wellbeing: if liberty be not that, 4 for onehave small care about liberty! You do not allow a palpable madman toleap over precipices3 you violate his liberty, you that are wise3 andkeep him, were it in strait-waistcoats, away from the precipices+Every stupid, every cowardly and foolish man is but a less palpablemadman: his true liberty were that a wiser man, that any and everywiser man, could, by brass collars, or in whatever milder or sharperway, lay hold of him when he was going wrong, and order and compel himto go a little righter! 5, if thou really art my 1Senior1, Seigneur,my 1Elder1, 6resbyter or 6riest,--if thou art in very deed my 1 iser1,may a beneficent instinct lead and impel thee to 'conuer' me, tocommand me+ 4f thou do know better than 4 what is good and right, 4con7ure thee in the name of 2od, force me to do it3 were it by never  2 such brass collars, whips and handcuffs, leave me not to walk overprecipices+ That 4 have been called, by all the 8ewspapers, a 'freeman' will avail me little, if my pilgrimage have ended in death andwreck! 5 that the 8ewspapers had called me slave, coward, fool, orwhat it pleased their sweet voices to name me, and 4 had attained notdeath, but life+--&iberty reuires new definitions! 2. Joh 8tu rt ill,s utilit ri  lessos i deor +: e t to seure the gre test CIIC h ppiess o( the gre test ubers2.1. he priiples 3hih i(or the ;ibert+ o( the Press e<pl ied i On Liberty 4 Ch pter II: 5( the ;ibert+ o( hought d >isussio7 the logi o( truth i ill,s ess +s 5@eth 7 d 5Coleridge7 s opleet to the e< ples pro%ided i On Liberty h pter II THE TIME, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the liberty of the press as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an eecutive, not identified in interest with the people, toprescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear.  the s e eph sis4 i ill,s te<t4 o the libert+ o( tu l people/idi%idu ls4 s i C rl+le,s ple :  !et us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thins of eerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what itconceives to be their voice. #ut I deny the right of the people to eercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. $the liberalcreed, the idea of modern democracy, cf. later in the lecture%plan & and earlier in time , 'ohn Henry Newman(s The Idea of a University   ) It is as noious, or more noious, when eerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all manind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, manind would be no more *ustified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be *ustified in silencing manind. Mill proceeded to eplain what happened in two cases when a man!s opinion was silenced: the peculiar evil of silencing the epression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race+ posterity as well as the eisting generation+ those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of echanging error for truth if wrong, they lose, what  # is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.--------------------------.irst the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth+ but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the /uestion for all manind, and eclude every other person from the means of *udging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their   certainty is the same thing as absolute  certainty. 0ll silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. he demonstration about the de#rees of certainty available in accordance with the rules of reason were  presented by Mill in his essays dedicated to $entham and Colerid#e : %. ruth is a socially defined function of several truths, pra#matic and synthetic. It is obtained as a combination that results after harmonisin# several partial truths, as can be possessed by real people in concrete circumstances. In his essay &Colerid#e&, Mill shows that: &'ll students of man and society () are aware that the besettin# dan#er is not so much of embracin# falsehood for truth, as of mistain# part of the truth for the whole. It mi#ht be plausibly maintained that in almost every one of the leadin# controversies, past or present, in social philosophy, both sides were in the ri#ht in what they affirmed, thou#h in the wron# in what they denied* and that if either could have been made to tae the other!s views in addition to its own, little more would have been needed to mae its doctrine correct.& (+- I p. /0)'nd the nuances Mill is capable of detachin# in matters of partial turths have practically no end& hus, it is in re#ardto every important partial truth* there are always two conflictin# modes of thou#ht, one tendin# to #ive to that truth too lar#e, the other to #ive it too small a place* and the history of opinion is #enerally an oscillation between these etremes.& (1itto, p. 23)It is possible to harmoni4e the conflictin# modes, but only in the lon# run, and very #radually: & hus, every ecess in either direction determines a correspondin# reaction* improvement consistin# only in this, that the oscillation, each time, departs rather less widely from the centre, and an ever5increasin# tendency is manifested to settle finally in.& (1itto, p. 2%) here is a ind of physical, mathematical necesity shown to be at wor in this etremely rational model of human society, which proves the point made before, about the model of science underlyin# the clear, persuasive liberal discourse.6. ruth prevails over error (or as Mill calls error &human fallibility&), because it is possible to correct past errors and to learn from them, so that all times &there is 7ust enou#h truth for correct action& (&8n 9iberty&, in +-, p. /%3). ere, Mill!s theory veers into the moral and ethical realm, and it seems inspired by one of ;esus Christ!s own reassurin# teachin#s to the disciples. & here is no such thin# as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. () Complete liberty of contradictin# and disprovin# our opinion is the very condition which 7ustifies us in assumin# its truth for purposes of action* and on no other terms can a bein# with human faculties have any rational assurance of  bein# ri#ht.& (1itto)   he way to incline the balance in favour of truth by correctin# error is, therefore, action. ere is the ey of Mill!s  pra#matic optimism which he inherited by means of a closely supervised education from his father, n#land!s #reatest utilitarian philosopher, ;ames Mill.<. +ublic opinion, discussion, is the complement of thou#ht and eperience, which are of necessity limited, 7ust as the individual person is. chan#e of ideas and eperience, however, if conducted accordin# to the laws of 7usticeand rationality, or if conducted fairly enou#h can correct errors and mae humanity asymptotically approach in actionwhat it cannot hope to attain in principle.e (man in #eneral, our note ) is capable of rectifyin# his mistaes, by discussion and eperience. =ot by eperience alone. here must be discussion to show how eperience is to be interpreted. >ron# opinions and practices #radually yield to fact and ar#ument: but facts and ar#uments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brou#ht  before it. -ery few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to brin# out their meanin#. he whole stren#th and value, then, of human 7ud#ment, dependin# on the one property, that it can be set ri#ht when it is wron#.& (+- I, p. /%%) Mill!s ar#uments & illustrations of cases a#ainst the freedom of opinion* and of the fact that truth is part of the utility The truth of an opinion is part of its utility  : the Catholic Church, ?ocrates and the mperor Marcus 'urelius (as a persecutor of Christians)5 It is not too much to re/uire that what the wisest of manind, those who are best entitled to trust their own *udgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. The most intolerant of churches, the 1oman 2atholic 2hurch, even at the canoni3ation of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a devil4s advocate. The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him is nown and weighed.5ocrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time, there too place a memorable collision$-)was put to death by his countrymen, aftera *udicial conviction, for impiety and immorality. Impiety, in denying the gods recognised by the 5tate+ indeed his accuser asserted $see the  Apologia)  that he believed in no gods at all. Immorality, in being, by his doctrines and instructions, a corrupter of youth. 6f these charges the tribunal, there is every ground for believing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of manind, to be put to death as a criminal.Marcus 0urelius et us add one more eample, the most striing of all, if the impressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him who falls into it. If ever any one, possessed of power, had grounds for thining himself the best and most enlightened among his cotemporaries, it was the Emperor Marcus 0urelius. 0bsolute monarch of the whole civili3ed world, he preserved through life not only the most unblemished *ustice, but what was less to be epected from his 5toical breeding, the tenderest heart. The few failings which are attributed to him,
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