of 304
All materials on our website are shared by users. If you have any questions about copyright issues, please report us to resolve them. We are always happy to assist you.
Related Documents
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE MANUAL JULY 2011 Incorporating Change 1, 31 MAY 2012 Operations OPERATIONS IN A CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE (CBRNE) ENVIRONMENT COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available for downloading or ordering on the e- Publishing website at RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication OPR: AFCESA/CEXR Supersedes: AFH , 30 October 2001, AFMAN , 29 May 2003; AFMAN , 30 October 2001 Certified by: AF/A7CX (Col Jeffery A. Vinger) Pages: 310 This Manual expands upon the guidance in Air Force Instruction (AFI) , Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations. It also aligns the Air Force (AF) with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF). This Manual integrates operational approaches to conventional and irregular warfare passive defense and consequence management operations using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) materials. This Manual provides standards for planning, logistical requirements, emergency response actions, emergency response organizational guidelines, exercises and evaluations, personnel training, detection, identification, warning and notification actions. It establishes responsibilities, procedures and standards for prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation resulting from conventional or irregular attacks using CBRNE materials. Within the context of this document prevention action which are not referenced in the document are taken throughout preparedness phase of incident management to protect lives and property through the use of intelligence, inspections, vulnerability assessments and improved security methods in order to prevent or lessen the effects of attacks. This Manual includes CBRNE procedures for use both within the continental United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). Its prescribed planning process helps responders to achieve unity of effort, allocate and use resources effectively and identify shortfalls 2 AFMAN JULY 2011 in their response capabilities. This publication applies to Active Duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard (ANG) units worldwide. Consult cited policy directives, instructions, manuals and their supplements for specific policies, procedures and requirements. Send recommended changes and major command (MAJCOM) supplements to this publication to AFCESA/CEXR, 139 Barnes Drive, Tyndall AFB, FL or to Use AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication for recommended changes. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) , Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at The use of the name or mark of any manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force. SUMMARY OF CHANGES These changes have not been integrated into the basic publication. The reader must use this IC in conjunction with the publication and these changes take precedence. This IC updates numerous administrative changes and Contamination Control Area (CCA) procedural changes in Attachment 9. Chapter 1 OVERVIEW Overview Purpose Mission Operational Environment Policy Overview Table 1.1. Maturing and Emerging Challenges Chapter 2 PREPAREDNESS Preparedness Overview Figure 2.1. Phases of Incident Management Planning - Threat Probability and the Operational Environment Figure 2.2. Probability of Threats Table 2.1. Resources for Locating Information Regarding CBRNE Hazards Table 2.2. Representative Listing of Plans with CBRNE Defense Considerations Figure 2.3. Table 2.3. Air Force Emergency Management Program Structural Relationships Installation Level Potential CBRNE Defense-Related Disconnects Between Air Force Units And Other Services Or Nations... 19 AFMAN JULY Figure 2.4. Vulnerability Assessment Process Figure 2.5. Increased Use and Impact of IEDs on American Casualty Figures in Iraq War ( ) Table 2.4. Approximate High-Explosive Fragmentation Distances Table 2.5. Representative CBRNE Vulnerabilities Table 2.6. Representative CBRNE Vulnerability Reduction Measures Table 2.7. Representative Examples of Commander s Intent regarding CBRNE Events Figure 2.6. Installation Command and Control (C2) Matrix Table 2.8. Representative Contamination Avoidance Activities across the CBRN Threat Spectrum Table 2.9. Considerations for Establishing CBRN Zones Figure 2.7. Installation Zone Identification Notional Example Table CBRN Zone Transition Point Operational Guidelines Table Contaminated Area Exit and Enter Actions Table Contaminated Waste Control Planning Considerations Table Equipment Considerations for CCTs Training and Exercises Chapter 3 RESPONSE Response Overview CBRNE Operational Standards and Enabling Tasks Table 3.1. CBRNE Defense Enabling Tasks Table 3.2. Wartime Chemical Attack Standards Trigger Events Table 3.3. Effective Biological Event Mitigation Options: Response Command and Control Table 3.4. CP Staff Responsibilities Installation Notification and Warning System (INWS) Table 3.5. Description of Defense Readiness Conditions Figure First and Emergency Responders Missions Conventional CBRNE Attack Response Estimated VX Liquid Agent Deposition Time Following a SCUD Airburst Warhead Detonation 250 Meters (820 feet) Above Ground Level Figure 3.2. Potential TIC/TIM Delivery Mechanisms Table 3.6. Illustrative TIC/TIM Hazard Plume Dimensions... 78 4 AFMAN JULY 2011 Table 3.7. Comparison of Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) Vapor Levels between CWAs and Representative High Threat TIC/TIM Table 3.8. Ability of People to Sense Presence of TIC/TIM Vapor prior to Impairment Terrorist Attack Response Actions Withdrawal/Evacuation Chapter 4 RECOVERY AND MITIGATION Overview of Recovery and Mitigation Contamination Control Table 4.1. Essential Requirements for Conducting Decontamination Operations Table 4.2. Levels of Decontamination Table 4.3. Summary of Chemical Agent Transfer Tests involving VX Table 4.4. Summary of Biological Agent Contact Transfer Analysis Table 4.5. Half-Life of Chemical Agents Table 4.6. Aircraft Decontamination Techniques Table 4.7. Formulas for Creating Five Percent Chlorine Solution Contamination Avoidance Table 4.8. Chemically Contaminated Object Handling Guidelines Background Table 4.9. Simplified Chemically Contaminated Object Guidelines Table Advanced Chemically Contaminated Object Rule Guidelines Recovery Actions for Conventional and Irregular CBRNE Attacks Figure 4.1. Standard Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Conventional Hazard Markers Figure 4.2. Expedient Nuclear, Biological, and Conventional Hazard Markers Hazard Duration Table Factors Affecting Determination of Hazard Duration Timeline Table Half-Life Information for Selected Radioisotopes Mission Continuation Medical Protection and Casualty Management Restoration of Infrastructure Mitigation Chapter 5 INFORMATION COLLECTION, RECORDS, AND FORMS Information Collections Records Attachment 1 GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 124 AFMAN JULY Attachment 2 IPE AND PPE ANALYSIS 165 Attachment 3 INCIDENT COMMANDER S GUIDE TO FIRST AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE MISSIONS 179 Attachment 4 SHELTER PROCEDURES 215 Attachment 5 CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH YIELD EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE DECISION TOOLS 232 Attachment 6 REPRESENTATIVE CBRNE THREAT PROFILES 258 Attachment 7 POST ATTACK RECONNAISSANCE (PAR) TEAMS 285 Attachment 8 CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) FORCE PROTECTION (FP) MEASURES 289 Attachment 9 CONTAMINATION CONTROL AREA (CCA) PROCEDURES 294 6 AFMAN JULY 2011 Chapter 1 OVERVIEW 1.1. Overview. How Air Force installations and units operate in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive environment is an evolving effort. In 2002 the Air Force implemented the counter-chemical warfare concept of operations (CONOPS) that changed how installations prepared for and responded to conventional chemical munitions attacks. The AF further defined the most probable threat as tactical ballistic missiles. That reevaluation of the threat became the basis for developing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for installations to recover and continue mission operations. In 2003, the AF began investigating potential vulnerabilities for biological attacks by conducting exercises at Kunsan AB, Korea. These exercises led to the development and refinement of TTPs for responding to conventional and irregular biological warfare attacks. The resulting counter-biological warfare CONOPS was institutionalized through two Air Force Instructions: AFI , Emergency Health Powers on Air Force Installations and AFI , Disease Containment Planning Guidance. In 2009, the Air Force published and began implementing the Counter-Radiological Warfare CONOPS. This CONOPS is being institutionalized through this document and other Air Force and multiservice directives The nuclear threat has been exhaustively studied. The AF will review existing information to determine a need to change TTPs for nuclear weapon threats. This manual will incorporate the information from all CBRNE efforts as they mature in order to provide installations guidance to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a conventional or irregular CBRNE attack In addition to developing Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological CONOPS, the AF has made changes to its emergency response procedures and operations. The impetus for these changes includes Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidents (28 February 2003), The National Response Framework, and the subsequent Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Homeland Defense (26 January 2004). These references mandated the integration of the NRF and HSPD-5 into Department of Defense (DOD) incident management and emergency response plans. Information on the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) is in AFMAN , Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) Standards and Procedures. Procedures for detailed planning, organization, training, and response and recovery information for accidents and natural disasters are in AFMAN , Air Force Incident Management Guidance for Major Accidents and Natural Disasters Purpose. This Manual provides commanders, staff, key agencies, units and the Disaster Response Force (DRF), which includes first and emergency responders, guidance to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate an enemy attack through conventional or irregular warfare. Additionally, this Manual implements the AFIMS in compliance with the intent and guidelines in HSPD-5. This Manual expands the guidance in AFI , to provide installations the guidance needed to sustain and continue the mission after an attack from an enemy state or terrorist organization. Installations apply the applicable procedures from this manual to develop CBRN plans for the hazards likely to affect the location. Note: Installations AFMAN JULY with limited CBRNE defensive capability, the MAJCOM will determine what capabilities these installations will maintain to respond to a CBRNE attack Mission. Operations in a CBRNE environment are intended to balance mission continuation with force survivability to maximize mission effectiveness during and after a CBRNE event. Towards this end, the concept of risk assessment is an integral part of the equation. Commanders will either accept or mitigate the risk based on threat and vulnerability assessments, resources available, and the anticipated or actual mission impact. This Manual supports that process by providing key information, procedures, and actions needed to prepare, survive, and restore mission capability after a CBRNE event Operational Environment. An operational environment (OE) is a compilation of interrelated conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the commander s decisions. An assessment of the OE consists of a detailed analysis of the CBRNE threats and hazards and the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time variables (PMESII-PT). These assessments determine the type of the OE that forces will operate in. MAJCOM and Air Operation Center staff should develop a picture of the OE for their area of responsibility to determine the capabilities required Threat and Hazard Assessments. Threat and hazard assessments are used to assist commanders and planning functions to determine what threats they face at their installation or a deployed location. The threat and hazard assessment provides commanders and planning functions an idea of the threat or hazards that exist in the OE. The process is discussed in more detail in AFMAN and Chapter 2 of this Manual PMESII-PT. PMESII-PT is a joint systems approach that allows commanders, planners, and support staff to understand the OE. The PMESII-PT variables provide a framework for understanding, characterizing, and managing CBRNE threats and hazards specific to an OE. Consideration of the variables of PMESII-PT can lead to the identification of key CBRNE vulnerabilities. A conventional adversary has all of these variables, with many of them possessing tangible infrastructure that is easily identified by Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). An irregular adversary has the same variables to varying degrees; however, the nature of the variables may be different. Irregular adversaries are organized in a fundamentally different way than states, and they manifest themselves in completely different ways. The utility of the PMESII-PT construct for irregular forces is still valid. For deterrence, the political, psychological, and economic characteristics of an OE assume increased importance at the operational and tactical levels. For example, on the political scale, if an adversary has possessed CBRNE weapons during past crises, it becomes important to understand the effect that the presence of those weapons has on the region's politics and on the decision to use or withhold such weapons. It also provides vulnerability reduction measures by understanding the enemy s national and strategic considerations, operational considerations, threats, information, their infrastructure, and the physical environment Political. Political decisions made during the conduct of military operations impact the strategic, operational, and tactical actions that shape the OE. Planners and combatant command (COCOM) staffs must understand the political environment of nation states or non-state actors to determine how it could affect the OE. Planners and 8 AFMAN JULY 2011 commanders should conduct an analysis of the adversary s strategic capabilities. It is vital to understand the adversary s motivations and values in order to be able to estimate the pressure it might feel to use, or withhold, CBRN weapons in a particular situation. Political, psychological, and economic considerations that influence deterrence may be the dominant factors influencing the adversary s courses of action. At this level, the analysis of the adversary s strategic capabilities will concentrate on considerations such as the psychology of political leadership, national will and morale, ability of the economy to sustain warfare, possible willingness to use CBRN weapons, and possible intervention by third-party countries and non-state groups. Consider other factors such as treaties, international law, and moral or religious issues with the enemy using CBRN weapons Military. The military variable includes aspects of the OE such as armed forces, security forces (SF), insurgent groups, paramilitary organizations, and criminal groups. It includes an analysis of how the effects of a CBRNE environment will impact personnel, mission operations, weapons systems, and the installations. Commanders must analyze the enemies weapon systems to determine their accuracy, the likely means of delivery for attacks involving CBRNE materials, the ranges of the weapon systems, and the likely enemy firing protocol (number of munitions and separation time between weapons). In addition, commanders must assess the suitability and effectiveness of the protection and detection equipment the installation possesses, to include the capability of active defense systems (such as the Patriot anti-aircraft/missile system) to intercept and destroy enemy weapon systems Economic. The economic variable looks at the formal economy, including production, distribution, consumption, labor force, and trade. While this is not an installation or MAJCOM responsibility, an analysis of the enemy s economy provides insight into their ability to sustain a war, to produce CBRNE weapons, and if their trade partners might become involved in the war if trade is cut off Social. When evaluating the social variable in the OE, commanders and planners should look at these areas: What is the social structure of the people operating or living in the area of operations? What are their religious beliefs and sensitivities the commander and the forces operating in the area need to be aware? Does the enemy have allies that might enhance their capabilities? Do they have a history of using CBRNE weapons? What are the known attitudes of the population to the government and/or ruling force? Is the population accustomed to local warfare and civilian casualties? Has the enemy shown a willingness to knowingly endanger the resident populace? Information. The information variable evaluates intelligence, media information, and other sources to provide details on the status of enemy and friendly forces. This helps produce a common operating picture of the OE. Accurate and timely intelligence information provides commanders with situational awareness of the enemy s capabilities to use and sustain CBRNE weapons attacks Infrastructure. The infrastructure variable is more than the collection of physical assets. Planners have to evaluate the likelihood and impact of potential hazardous releases from local activities or industries such as pipelines, storage, or shipping facilities. What is the civil response capability of hospitals, clinics, and other medical treatment facilities to handle patients from a CBRNE incident? Are there water sources AFMAN JULY available that can be used for decontamination purposes? The infrastructure must be evaluated on what is available for friendly forces as well as enemy forces. For example, if an enemy has underground, hardened chemical-biological storage and missile launch facilities, it is possible that those assets will be able to survive initial U.S. attacks and present a longer-term threat Physical Environment. The physical environment includes weather, terrain, geography, and manmade structures within the operational area. Weather and terrain must be well understood in the operational area to determine the optimal timing for the enemy s use of CBRN weapons against an installation. Note that the enemy can use CBRN weapons at any time but that the adverse impact will be greater under some circumstances than others. Planners can use this physical environment information to assess and predict the effects of CBRN weapons using modeling and predictive tools. Refer to Air Force Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (AFTTP) (I) , Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance, and AFTTP(I) , Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection,
We Need Your Support
Thank you for visiting our website and your interest in our free products and services. We are nonprofit website to share and download documents. To the running of this website, we need your help to support us.

Thanks to everyone for your continued support.

No, Thanks