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Evidence on the Impact of Minimum Wage Laws in an Informal Sector Domestic

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  Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector: Domesticworkers in South Africa ☆ Taryn Dinkelman  a, ⁎ , Vimal Ranchhod  b a Dartmouth College, United States b University of Cape Town, South Africa a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f o  Article history: Received 27 July 2010Received in revised form 6 December 2011Accepted 27 December 2011Available online 4 January 2012  JEL classi  󿬁 cation:  J08 J48O15 Keywords: Minimum wageInformal sectorDomestic workersAfrica Whathappens when apreviously uncoveredlabor marketisregulated? Weexploittheintroductionofamin-imum wage in South Africa and variation in the intensity of this law to identify increases in wages for domes-tic workers and no statistically signi 󿬁 cant effects on employment on the intensive or extensive margins.These large, partial responses to the law are somewhat surprising, given the lack of monitoring and enforce-ment in this informal sector. We interpret these changes as evidence that strong external sanctions are notnecessary for new labor legislation to have a signi 󿬁 cant impact on informal sectors of developing countries,at least in the short-run.© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Whathappenstowagesandemploymentintheinformalsectoraftertheintroduction of a minimum wage inthat sector? Thevast minimumwage literature in economics has remarkably little to say on this ques-tion, since the informal sector has more often represented the uncov-ered sector in this research and has been used to help distinguishbetween models of the labor market. For example, if the wage and em-ploymenteffectsofachangeintheformalsectorminimumaremirroredby opposite-signed responses in the informal sector, this is consistentwithasegmentedtwo-sectorlabormarketmodel. 1 However,ifinformalsector wages increase and employmentdecreases whena formal sectorminimum is adjusted upwards, this is consistent with spillovers in anintegrated labor market, or possibly with  “ lighthouse effects ” . 2 In thispaper,weextendtheminimumwageliteratureandinvestigatewhethera minimum wage 󿬂 oor canhave anyeffect when directly applied totheinformalsector,wheretheinstitutionalenvironmentformonitoringandenforcement of penalties is weak. We use the introduction of the  󿬁 rstminimum wage in South Africa's domestic worker sector in November2002 to analyze what can happen in the short-run.Whether a minimum wage can have any impact in the informalsector is broadly relevant for understanding more about the processof labor market formalization in developing countries. As economiesdevelop, labor relationships shift from rural to urban areas and takeplace in larger and larger  󿬁 rms; employers and employees start topay taxes and workers gain legal protections, often including a guar-anteed minimum rate of pay. Such protections, when enforced, maysigni 󿬁 cantly improve working conditions and reduce poverty amongthe least skilled workers (Lustig and McLeod (1997) summarize re-sults from several studies), or may hinder the operation of markets  Journal of Development Economics 99 (2012) 27 – 45 2 Spillover effects into the informal sector or other formal uncovered sectors havebeen documented by many researchers, particularly in Latin American countries. SeeLemos (2009) for Brazil, Gindling and Terrell (2004) for Costa Rica, Maloney and Menendez (2004) for a variety of Latin American countries, Bell (1997) for Mexico and Colombia. See also Cortes (2004) for the USA. Brown (1988) notes that in the US, a large fraction of workers earn the minimum wage, even though they areemployed by establishments not subject to the minimum wage law. ☆  Without implicating them in any way, this paper has bene 󿬁 ted from discussionswith John Bound, Charlie Brown, John DiNardo, David Lam, James Levinsohn, JustinMcCrary, Jeffrey Smith and Gary Solon and from the helpful comments of Tom Hertzand several referees. We are very grateful to Nicola Branson for sharing her data onLFS sample weights with us. ⁎  Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: (T. Dinkelman), (V. Ranchhod). 1 See Brown (1988) for a discussion of two sector models in minimum wage studies.Brown (1999), Card and Krueger (1997) and Neumark and Wascher (1995, 2007) pro- vide comprehensive reviews of the large minimum wage literature.0304-3878/$  –  see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.12.006 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect  Journal of Development Economics  journal homepage:  and negatively affect productivity (as in Besley and Burgess, 2004) andemployment. 3 For many countries contemplating such regulation, re-sources for monitoring and enforcement are limited. And, since mosteconomic models of employer behavior require some penalty and anon-zeroprobabilityofbeingauditedtopredictanyeffectsofminimumwage regulations (see Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) for the canonicalmodel of minimum wage compliance), a  󿬁 rst order question for manydeveloping countries is what effects can be expected from new laborlegislation in the face of limited monitoring and enforcement? 4 Inthispaper,weshedlightontheeffectsofnewlaborregulationinacontextwithlittleactiveenforcementandnoclearpenalties.Wepresentan empirical example in which domestic work employers face an ex-tremely high minimum wage (set at the 70th percentile of the pre-lawwage distribution) with no effective penalties and a vanishingly smallprobabilityofbeingaudited, andshowthatemployersstillchoosetore-spondtothelaw.Wedocumentimmediate,largeandpartialadjustmentof wages upwards in the wake of thelaw and 󿬁 nd no statistically signif-icanteffectsontheintensiveorextensivemarginsofwork,atleastintheshort-run,sixteenmonthsafterthelawisenacted. 5 Wealsoseeevidenceofdramaticincreasesinthefractionofdomesticworkerswhohaveafor-mal contract of employment, unemployment insurance coverage andemployer-provided pensioncontributions after the law. This South Afri-cancaseindicatesthattheeffectsoflaborlegislationmaynotrestonthetype of enforcement that exists in already formalized markets; rather,the introduction of the law itself may serve as a focal point for shiftingmarkets in the direction of becoming more formal. 6 The domestic work sector is important in its own right, and isunder-studied given its prevalence over space and time. Historically,this sector has been important in developed countries. Rubinow(1906) uses census data to show that over 1.2 million women wereemployed in domestic work in the US in 1900. World-wide, the mar-ket for domestic workers currently employs many millions of women: foreign workers employed in private households make uparound10%of thelaborforcein a numberof MiddleEasterncountries(Kremer and Watt, 2006); foreign domestic workers constitute 6% of the workforce in Hong Kong (Cortes and Pan, 2009); while ILO datafor OECD countries record an average of 100,000 female domesticworkers per country. The UK and Germany are at the high end of this range with 400,000 and 460,000 female domestic workers re-spectively. In South Africa, about one in three working women areemployed in domestic work.Inmostoftheselabormarkets,thedomesticworksector 󿬁 tstheILO'sde 󿬁 nition of   ‘ informal ’ : the majority of   󿬁 rms are one-employee enter-prises (households) in which labor relations are predominantly uncon-tracted and workers do not enjoy minimum wage protections or othernon-wage bene 󿬁 ts like unemployment insurance or pensions. Thesmallscaleofemployersmakesthissectorcostlyforunionstoorganize. 7 Work often extends beyond simple housekeeping services and can re-quire a great deal of trust, particularly when child-care is involved orwhen the employer is absent during working hours. Additionally, andparticularly in Asia, Latin America and the USA, domestic workers areoften foreign migrant workers with tenuous legal status. This increasestheirvulnerabilityinthelabormarket. 8 Forexample,intheUSA,domes-tic workers are largely undocumented and are not yet guaranteed all of the protections of the National Labor Standards Act. 9 We believe ouranalysis of the South African case sheds light on the short-run effects of introducingminimumwagelegislationtotheseinformalanduncoveredwork relationships that are found throughout the world.The empirical exercise in this paper is straightforward. We evaluatethe effects of South Africa's 2002 minimum wage law for domesticworkers by exploiting time-series variation in the application of thelaw and pre-existing cross-sectional variation related to the intensity of thelawtoidentifywageandemploymenteffects.Weuselaborforcesur-vey (LFS) data from 2001 to 2004 to capture worker-reported wages,hours of work and employment every six months. Large shifts in thewage and earnings distributions of domestic workers are evident in ournon-parametric kernel densities. Exploiting only the before-after varia-tion, domestic worker wages increase by about 20% in the 16 monthsafterthelaw.Althoughthissharpjumpinwagesinarelativelyshortpe-riod of time is strongly suggestive of the new law having had an impactin this sector, we are naturally concerned that contemporaneous shocksto the economy, or differential economic trends mightshow up as simi-larly large wage increases. We complement the before-after analysiswith a difference-in-differences strategy that adopts the methods inLee (1999) to statistically examine the effects of the law. 10 Speci 󿬁 cally,wecomparethechangeinwagesandhoursofworkofdomesticworkersin places where the median wage was far below the wage  󿬂 oor in thepre-period (high wage gap areas), to places where the median wagewas closer to the minimum (low wage gap areas), thereby combiningcross-sectional and time-series variation in the application of the law.We  󿬁 nd that wages increase by a statistically signi 󿬁 cant 13 – 15% in thewakeofthelaw.Incontrast,we 󿬁 ndnostatisticallysigni 󿬁 cantreductionin hours of work nor any signi 󿬁 cant change in the probability of a low-skilled female worker being employed as a domestic worker in the pre-versuspost-period,inhighwagegapcomparedtolowerwagegapareas.Although the minimum wage law as it was enacted exposed allurban areas at the same time, we make use of the fact that the lawis more demanding of employers in urban areas with lower pre-lawwages. 11 And, as in any difference-in-differences research designthat exploits a change in policy at one point in time, a key identi 󿬁 ca-tion assumption is that both the exposed and unexposed groups are 3 In that paper, Besley and Burgess (2004) show how active and costly pro-workerregulation in the formal manufacturing sector in India led to increased informality, re-duced investment and lower labor productivity. 4 Despitethegreateravailabilityofresourcesforenforcementindevelopedcountries,non-compliancewithminimumwagelawsiswidespread.AshenfelterandSmith(1979)notethatcompliancewiththeUSFederalminimumwagewasonly65%in1973;Cortes(2004)reportsthatin1997,asmanyas40%ofUSworkerswhoquali 󿬁 edwerepaidlessthantheminimumwage; and non-compliance rates in excess of 50% have been reported for Mexico, Morocco(Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997) and other developing countries. See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a comprehensive review of the literature on minimum wages from de-veloping countries. All of the theoretical literature on compliance with a minimum wagehingesonemployerschoosinganoptimallevelofcomplianceinthefaceofpenaltiesanden-forcement.SeeGrenier(1982),ChangandEhrlich(1985),BloomandGrenier(1986),Chang (1992), Lott and Roberts (1995) and Weil (2005). 5 One bene 󿬁 t of focussing on short-run effects is that there is little time for workersto sort across areas and relocate e.g. from rural to urban areas in search of higher wage jobs. In our data, roughly the same fraction of domestic workers report starting theircurrent job in the past year, both before and after the law (12% in September 2001and 14% in September 2003). 6 The  󿬁 rst minimum wage law introduced in the US in 1912 (in Massachusetts, forwomen) had some similar features to our setting. One penalty involved newspapers “ naming and shaming ”  non-compliant  󿬁 rms by publishing their names (Thies, 1991). 7 The ILO de 󿬁 nes  “ informal employment ”  as  “ all remunerative work (i.e. both self-employment and wage employment), that is not registered, regulated or protectedby existing legal or regulatory frameworks, as well as non-remunerative work under-taken in an income-producing enterprise. Informal workers do not have secure em-ployment contracts, worker's bene 󿬁 ts, social protection or workers' representation ” ( 8 This idea of heightened vulnerability is not new. In 1906, Rubinow (1906) writesabout the  “ servant girl's problem ”  and describes American preferences for hiring for-eign women for domestic work as being related to the  “ greater ease of managingthem ” , which translates into  “ longer hours, perhaps lowers wages, more work and,in general, conditions of service more favorable to the employer ” . 9 The state of New York recently became the  󿬁 rst state in the USA to sign into law aDomestic Workers Bill of Rights. Among other rights, the new law ensures that domes-tic workers have notice of termination, receive paid sick days and holidays, and otherbasic labor protections that are standard in the Fair Labor Standards Act. See the edito-rial  “ The Rights of Domestic Workers ” ,  The New York Times  June 15, 2009. Also the article  “ Senate Passes Histor-ic Bill To Protect Domestic Workers ”  at senate-passes-historic-bill-protect-domestic-workers posted on June 2, 2010. 10 In that paper, Lee (1999) uses regional differences in the relative level of the USfederal minimum wage to identify the effects of the minimum wage law on wage in-equality in the 1980s separately from the effects of national trends in wages. 11 Although there is some spatial variation in the level of the minimum, we explain inthe next section why we do not use this variation.28  T. Dinkelman, V. Ranchhod / Journal of Development Economics 99 (2012) 27  – 45  onthesametrendintheabsenceofthepolicychange.Thisisparticular-lyimportantforeconomicvariableslikewagesandhours,thatarelikelyto be able to move quickly in response to changes in general economicconditions.Animportantdefenseofouridenti 󿬁 cationstrategythereforerelies on providing some evidence that areas with larger pre-law wagegaps were not simply experiencing faster trend growth in wages andwere unlikely to be exposed to contemporaneous positive economicshocks. We address these concerns in two ways. First, we show thatareas with the smallest pre-law wage gaps appeared to experience thefastest GDP growth over the period, suggesting that if anything, labordemand trends are stronger in these less intensely  “ treated ”  provinces.Second,weperformaplaceboexperimentusingasetofsimilarworkerswho are unlikely to compete over jobs with domestic workers, butwhose job conditions likely re 󿬂 ect general economic conditions: low-skilled male manufacturing workers in urban areas. We  󿬁 nd that malemanufacturing wages do not grow faster in periods after the law in theplaces where the domestic worker minimum wage was more binding.This gives us more con 󿬁 dence that the difference-in-differences resultswe estimate for domestic workers are not being driven by differentialwage trends between high and low wage gap areas. This sample of male manufacturing workers is also helpful for a second reason, asthey also allow us to rule out the possibility of strong mean reversionin wages as a reason for our positive domestic worker wage results.Quite apart from the wage and employment effects of the law, wedocument that the introduction of the law had a substantive impactonmoregeneralconditionsofworkfordomesticworkers.Weexaminetheprobabilitythatadomesticworkerisprotectedbyaformaljobcon-tractwiththeiremployer,orhasanemployerprovidingunemploymentinsurance or pension bene 󿬁 ts after the law. The probability of an em-ployee having a formal contract more than doubles in the sixteenmonths after the law, regardless of the intensity of the minimumwage  󿬂 oor in their area of work; the fraction of workers enjoying pen-sion bene 󿬁 ts increases by about 7 percentage points, and the fractionof workers having UIF contributions made for them increases by 18 to20 percentage points. These improvements in the conditions of workfor domestic workers are substantial, immediate, and importantly, occuracross the distribution of wages (i.e. not just in areas where workerswere srcinally earning below the minimum). These results suggest thebeginning of the formalization of this industry, with potential far-reaching consequences for the nature of domestic work in South Africa.Giventheweakinstitutionalenvironmentforenforcementofthelaw,whichwedescribe,itissomewhatsurprisingthatweseesuchlargewageresponsesandnoemploymenteffectsinthisinformalsector.Isolatingtheexact reasons for the employer response is not easy; however, we pro-posetwopiecesofevidencethatsuggestthatemployerswerevoluntarilyandonlypartiallyrespondingtothelaw.First,wedevelopatestforpartialcompliance,whichshowsthatsomeworkersgetincreasesbringingtheirwagescloserto,butnotnearlyupto,compliantlevels.Thispartialcompli-ancelikelycontributestothelackofemploymenteffectsofthelaw. 12 Sec-ond, we show that the wage response of employers is not signi 󿬁 cantlydifferent across places with different audit probabilities, where we usethepresenceofalocalLaborCenter(LC)asaproxymeasureofthisprob-ability. Partial compliance that does not appear responsive to the likeli-hood of audit is consistent with the idea that employers may not havebeen primarily motivated by the threat of external sanctions.Two related, unpublished papers have examined the effect of theminimum wage law for domestic workers in South Africa: Hertz(2005)andYamada(2008).Ourstudydiffersfromthesestudiesinsev- eral ways. First, we focus on urban workers only, because we are con-cerned that identi 󿬁 cation of the impact of the new minimum wagelawforruraldomesticworkersislikelyconfoundedbytheconcomitantintroduction of a minimum wage for agricultural workers, a plausiblealternative sector of work for low-skilled workers in rural areas. 13 Sec-ond,weuseanupdatedandconsistentsetofsurveyweightsfortheLFSdata (Branson, 2009) which were not available for these studies. 14 Third, we use a higher level of aggregation (the province) to de 󿬁 neareas in which the new law was more or less binding, based on pre-law characteristics. This choice presents other challenges for inferencethat we deal with using an appropriate two-step estimator, describedindetailinourempiricalanalysissection. 15 Fourth,wepresentevidencefromaplacebotestusingoutcomesformalemanufacturingworkerthatbolster our causal claims for the effects of the law on domestic workerwages; this sample also allows us to rule out the possibility that meanreversion could account for the wage effects. Fifth, our results differfrom Hertz (2005) and Yamada (2008). Although we also  󿬁 nd positivewageeffectsoftheminimumwagelaw,we 󿬁 ndlittleevidenceforasta-tisticallysigni 󿬁 cantnegativeemploymenteffectofthelawoneithertheintensive or extensive margins of work. Finally, we also try to under-stand more about the motivations for response to the law. We showthat some employers appear to make partial adjustments of wages to-wards the minimum wage, but not quite up to the legal wage  󿬂 oor.And,weshowthatthewageeffectsofthelawdonotseemtobedrivenbyemployersrespondingtoapotentialthreatofaudit,asproxiedbythepresence of labor centers in the district. Our interpretation of this evi-dence is that the law sparked the beginning of a formalization of thismarket (as also evidenced by the improvement in contract coverage,UIF and pension bene 󿬁 ts) without strong external sanctions.Thepaperbeginswithadescriptionofthedomesticworkerindustryin South Africa before the law and describes the characteristics of thenew law introduced in 2002. After describing the data and presentingsummary statistics of our sample, we turn to documenting the wage,earnings,employmentandhoursofworkeffectsofthelawusingacom-bination of kernel densities for wages and earnings and difference-in-differences regressions. We discuss our test for and present evidenceof partial compliance with the law. We show that wage increases arenot larger in places with a higher probability of being audited, andthat the law increased the probability of a domestic worker having aformal employment contract, UIF and pension bene 󿬁 ts regardless of howlargetheinitialwagegapintheprovinceofresidencewas.Wecon-clude with a discussion and interpretation of the results. 2. The domestic worker industry in South Africa The domestic worker industry in South Africa employs 18% of allwomen,and80%ofalldomesticworkersarefemale.PoorlyeducatedAf-rican and colored women make up the vast majority of these domesticworkers. 16 Ineachyearofourstudy,about35%ofurbanAfricanandcol-oredfemaleworkerswereinthedomesticworksector,andabout60%of all domestic workers were employed in urban areas. Unlike many LatinAmerican and Middle Eastern settings, and more like countries in therest of Africa and parts of India, the majority of domestic workers inSouthAfricaarenotforeigners.Table1presentsmeansandstandardde-viations of female domestic worker demographics for theperiod beforethe law (September 2001, March 2002 and September 2002) and theperiod after the law (March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004). 12 This  󿬁 nding relates to a theoretical point made by Basu et al. (2007). The authors develop a model in which governments accept some non-compliance with minimumwage legislation to achieve distributional goals. 13 Agricultural workers received protection under a minimum wage law, also for the 󿬁 rst time, six months after the domestic worker minimum wage  󿬂 oor was imposed. 14 Details of this choice are discussed in the data section. 15 Hertz's (2005) working paper uses some of the same LFS cross-sectional data to es-timate the impact of the law on wages and employment using a difference-in-differences approach that relies on amuch smaller unit of analysis (the magisterial dis-trict).He relates the intensity of the minimum wage law to the fraction of workers in amagisterial district who initially earned below the minimum (following Card andKrueger, 1997). We choose not to use magisterial districts as the unit of analysis, sincemany districts contain only a few (under 10) individuals in each wave who areemployed as domestic workers. 16 FollowingmuchoftheeconomicliteratureonSouthAfrica,weuseapartheid-eraracialclassi 󿬁 cations: African for Black South African, and colored for individuals of mixed race.29 T. Dinkelman, V. Ranchhod / Journal of Development Economics 99 (2012) 27  – 45  All statistics are weighted, and the data sources are described in moredetail in the next section. 17 The average age of these workers is around 40, the majority areAfrican women and they have between 6 and 7 years of education,which is roughly completed primary school. This is 0.8 to 2 yearsbelow the average education of women working in the most closelyrelated skill group: women in elementary occupations (e.g. newspa-per vendors, of  󿬁 ce cleaners, hawkers, building caretakers, garbagecollectors etc) and the female self-employed. 79% of domesticworkers report working full-time, de 󿬁 ned as 28 hours or more perweek, making the majority subject to the full-time minimum wage.Domestic workers are typically poorly remunerated. Mean wagesare lower in this occupational category than in any other: the ratioof the mean domestic worker wage to the mean wage for otherlow-skilled African and colored elementary workers (self-employedwomen) was 0.49 (0.64) in September 2001. Prior to November2002, there was no minimum wage in the domestic worker sectorand no formal mechanism existed for domestic workers to negotiatewages. Wages were typically set unilaterally by the employer house-hold or in consultation with other local employers (see Cock (1989)for a qualitative description of this process). Although some aspectsof the 1997 South African Basic Conditions of Employment Act gov-erned overtime provisions, leave considerations, minimum notice pe-riods, fair dismissal procedures and severance pay for all workers (SouthAfricanDepartmentofLabor,1997),thesewererarelyadheredtoamongdomesticworkeremployers(LouwandVanderBerg,2004).Forexample,only 10% of domestic workers had a formal contract of employment in2001, compared with 55% of elementary occupation workers.Insettingthe 󿬁 rstnationalminimumwagefordomesticworkers,theDepartment of Labor (DoL) took into account the recommendations of agovernment-appointed Employment Conditions Commission. Thisgroup of government representatives and academics de 󿬁 ned the scopeoftheDomesticWorkerSectorandconcludedthatanywage 󿬂 oorshould “ improve the livelihoods of those worst off  ”  and  “ retain jobs ” . Their rec-ommendation for the actual minimum wage level was higher than thatinitially proposed by the government, and was the one eventuallyadopted (Budlender et al, 2002).Underthenewlaw,whichbecameeffectiveon1November2002,do-mesticworkersandgardenersworkinginprivatehomeshadtherighttoaminimumwageandto8%annualwageincreases. 18 Theurbanfull-timehourly minimum wage was set at ZAR4.10 (USD 0.410) in November2002; the part-time wage was ZAR4.51 (USD 0.451) where part-timeworkisde 󿬁 nedasfewerthan28hoursperweek. 19 Sinceabout80%ofdo-mesticworkersinurbanareasworkfull-time,wefocusontheurbanfull-time minimum as the relevant wage  󿬂 oor throughout the paper. 20 In 17 Throughout, we use the following de 󿬁 nition of domestic workers: currentlyemployed African or colored females aged 20 to 59 inclusive, who live in urban areasand have their occupation coded as  “ working as a domestic worker in a private house-hold ”  for theweek prior to thesurvey. Weexclude ahandful ofthese workers who alsoreport having their own business on the side and those who have more than a highschool level of education (12 years). 18 Garden workers, most of whom are men, are also covered as domestic workers underthis law. However, they make up a minority of domestic workers and we omit them fromour analysis. 19 The average Rand/USD exchange rate from June 2002 to January 2003 of ZAR10=USD1. 20 The law speci 󿬁 es different wages for two types of urban areas,  ‘ Area A ’  and  ‘ Area B ’ localities. These areas generally differ in size, and since Area A localities are the largesturban parts of the country, we use the full-time wage set for these areas as the urbanminimum wage. We cannot distinguish between A and B areas in our data to create a 󿬁 ner measure of treatment.  Table 1 Sample summary statistics.N Pre-law mean (s.d.) Post-law mean (s.d.) Post – Pre difference (s.e.) P value of the difference(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  A: Conditional on being in the labor force Employed at all 52,739 0.63 0.64 0.01 0.26(0.48) (0.48) (0.01)Employed as a domestic worker 52,739 0.35 0.34  − 0.01 0.13(0.48) (0.47) (0.01) B: Conditional on being employed as a domestic worker  Nominal monthly earnings (ZAR) 6160 546.26 658.39 112.14 0.00(386.73) (451.04) (26.08)Nominal hourly wage (ZAR) 6154 3.67 4.37 0.70 0.00(2.91) (3.59) (0.17)Hours of work per week 6876 39.44 38.72  − 0.72 0.41(14.75) (14.10) (0.82)Fraction paid>=minimum 6155 0.29 0.42 0.13 0.00(0.45) (0.49) (0.02)Full-time worker 6876 0.79 0.79 0.01 0.88(0.41) (0.40) (0.02)Fraction with a job contract 6784 0.10 0.27 0.18 0.00(0.30) (0.44) (0.02)Fraction with a pension 6867 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.00(0.18) (0.30) (0.01)Fraction with UI coverage 6867 0.02 0.21 0.19 0.00(0.15) (0.41) (0.02) C: Characteristics of women employed as domestic workers Age 6876 40.33 40.47 0.14 0.59(9.37) (9.29) (0.24)Education (years) 6876 6.62 6.96 0.35 0.00(3.44) (3.41) (0.08)African 6876 0.90 0.89  − 0.02 0.42(0.29) (0.31) (0.02)Data are from South African Labor Force Surveys (LFS 2001 – 2004). Sample includes African and colored females aged 20 – 59 inclusive, who have no more than a completed highschool education and who live in urban areas. Panel A includes workers and unemployed women looking for work; Panels B and C restrict to women employed as domestic workersin any period. All statistics are weighted and the standard errors of differences and p-values are calculated taking these weights and province-level clustering into account. The pre-law period includes LFS waves in September 2001, March 2002 and September 2002; the post-law period includes LFS waves in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004. Afull-time worker is someone who reports at least 27 hours of work per week; UIF is unemployment insurance.30  T. Dinkelman, V. Ranchhod / Journal of Development Economics 99 (2012) 27  – 45
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