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NYU Law PIL Reviewer 2006

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Public International Law
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  International Law (Spring 2006)Professor David GoloveDamrosch, Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, Smit,  International Law , th !d I.I NTRODUCTION A.Overview # $ules governing the nature of relations %et&een states2 'rigins are more civilla&, rather than common la& focus on state practice and custom, not cases B.Historical Trends # *atural la& (+uinas, Grotius)   Positivism and reliance on state practice2 -ustomar. la& %ased on usage, customs, %ilateral treaties   /niversalmultilateral treaties1 -ultural unit. and universalist ideologies   Diversit. and differences utual coe3istence and restraint   -ooperative pro%lem solving i) 4eague of *ations, /*, 54', P-5, 5-7 $egulation of aliens (  jus gentium )   *ationstates (8reat. of 9estphalia)   $ise of glo%al organi:ations6 ;reedom to use force &conduct of &ar rules   <asic principle of nonuse of force= !ast9est divide   +fter -old 9ar *orthSouth divide> <alance of po&er   /S as onl. superpo&er  C.General Issues # 5s it 4a&? i)  *ot @ust ar%itrar. moralit., %ut focuses on rights, forms, and detailsa)4a&like features technical, te3t%ound, revisa%le, ar%itrar., and morall. neutral ii) Sovereignt.a)Positivist la& must %e command of sovereign %acked %. threat of a sanction %)<inding character voluntar. %ut gro&ing effectiveness as states accept limitations to their sovereignt.c)Aoluntarism legal rules are result of free &ill of states iii) <enefits deterrence, education, standardsetting, clarit. iv) 5ndicators of legitimac. determinac. and clarit., s.m%olic validation, coherence, adherence %et&een o%ligation and applica%le rules2 !nforcea%ilit. i) $ules cater to voluntar. compliance coercive, nonforci%le sanctionsB centrali:ed organs ii) Po&er d.namics often determine &hen la& gets enforced iii) 5rrelevant to states &ho &ill onl. follo& la& &hen it is in their interests or under another state ’ s po&er a)<asis of reciprocal o%ligationsB use of “ soft ”  la&sB national interest in supporting int ’ l rule of la& iv) $ealists uestion &h. states should and do follo& int ’ l la&a)$easons shortterm interest, fear of reciprocit., democratic respect for la& II.S OURCES   O  I NTERNATIONAL  L A! A.Custo ar# International Law  (la& of nations)# General and consistent practice of states out of a sense of legal o%ligation ( opinio juris )2 Purpose i) -reate s.stem of rules and reciprocities that &ill %e follo&ed %. states ii) 4egitimi:ing &orld opinions1 $elation to 8reaties i)  *o& seen as interstitial default rules &ith the rise of multilateral treaties ii) a. allo& treat. provisions to %e %inding even on nonsignatories iii) ore responsive than treaties and conferences to less po&erful states and individual circumstances -reation -r.stalli:ationB 9idespread ratification of treat. %. all relevant statesB /* G + Declarations7 8ermination $ule e3ists until it is replaced %. opnio juris 6 -ustomar. international la& is part of domestic la& and can %e determined %. state practice ( The Paquete  Habana  /S court ruled that fishing vessels are e3empt from %eing pri:es of &ar)= Since customar. int ’ l la& is %ased on consent, restrictions cannot %e presumed ( S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Tur.)  8urke. needs not affirmativel. sho& universal rule supporting their @urisdiction %ased on territorialit.) i) Presumption of freedom is used to fill in gaps in a customar. int ’ l la& that ma. %e incomplete ii) ;rance had acuiesced to concurrent @urisdiction over ships %ased on the effects doctrine  a)+ffirmative steps needed to avoid acuiescence or tacit consent#)5ssues ignorance?, seriousness of act needed?, ne& states?, ma@orit. rule?, offering a prete3t &ill affirm the rule?, &hen is consensus reached? %)$ationale for consent sovereignt. %asisB pragmatic approach of enforcea%ilit. iii) Speciall. affected states need to consent specificall. to customar. restrictions> -ustomar. international la& reuires a consensus (  Legality o the Threat or !se o u#lear $eapons (%&visory 'pinion)  no authori:ation or prohi%ition, %ut an. use &ould pro%a%l. violate other rules of humanitarian la& and neutralit. principle of distinction, of no unnecessar. suffering v deterrence and selfdefense) i) 8reaties seem to ackno&ledge useB nonutili:ation isn ’ t necessaril. opinio juris B also negative votes to General +ssem%l. resolutions ii) onliquet   evidence does not clearl. resolve the issue, so court refuses to engage in la&creation iii) $egional customar. international la& is %ased more strictl. on consent (  %sylum ase (ol. v. Peru)  no constant and uniform usage or opinio juris )a)Persistent o%@ector either sho&s lack of consent or keeps rule form %ecoming la&#)Does not include peremptor. norms (  jus #ogens   –  can onl. %e modified %. ne&  jus #ogens )C 'pinio juris  means settled practice and evidence of a %elief that the practice is o%ligated (   orth Sea ontinental Shel (*er. v. +en., eth.)  !uidistance principle under Geneva -onvention &as not customar. la&) i) 8reat. principles can gain opinio juris  through a state ’ s attitudepractice (  Paramilitary %#tivities ( i#ar.v. !S)  /S reservation to 5- @urisdiction does not appl. to similar customar. la& principles) B.Treaties  (%ased on  pa#ta sunt servan&a )# 5ntroduction i) Priorit. over other sources, %ut courts should look to specific la& %efore general ii) 4ook at intention of parties, must %e terminated intentionall.2 -lasses General multilateralB -olla%orative mechanismsB <ilateral1 $elation to customar. international la& i) +dvantages rational processB includes ne& statesB strengthen e3isting customar. la&B more authorit. ii) 8reat. %ecomes customar. if it is declarator. of pree3isting custom, cr.stalli:es customar. la&, or generates ne& customar. la& 8.pes i) -odification 8reaties –  s.stemi:ation %ased on practice, precedent, and doctrine ii) Progressive Development 8reaties –  la&making C.General $rinci%les o& Law and E'uit# # -ommon principles in all municipal la& s.stems (often technical or procedural in nature)B valid in all societies %. the nature of man (minimum standards of @ustice and decenc.,  jus rationale ) i)  *ot %ased on state consent so might %e read narro&l. e3cept for human rights principles2 +lso principles inherent to nature of international la& s.stem  pa#ta sunt servan&a , sovereign eualit. D.Evidence o& Law (Su%sidiar. sources)# -ourt Decisions i) 5- Declarator. of la&, no stare decisis, discretionar. decisions ii) 'ther int ’ l or speciali:ed courts iii) unicipal courts used as evidence of state practice or opinio juris 2 9ritings of ualified Pu%licists –  onl. persuasive ( -ouse  )1 Declarations and $esolutions can %ecome customar. int ’ l la& through e3pectation of adherence opinio juris (  Filartiga v. PenaIrala  deli%erate torture violated international la&) i) State practice ma. differ from G + resolutionsB usuall. evidence of la& rather than la& itself  ii) $esolutions are political declarations, not codification or progressive development ( Tea#o v. Libya  later resolutions &ere passed &ithout the support of 9estern market econom. nations, so earlier rule not replaced)a)  +e lege eren&a  &hat the la& ought to %e v  #ontra legem  against the la&  “ Soft ”  la& voluntar. codesguidelinesB international standards, rules of nongovernmental %odiesB politicaldeclarations III.I NTERNATIONAL  L A!  ( ) UNICI$AL  L A! A.Introduction # 5nternational la& does not replace municipal la& %ut is %inding on state i) unicipal la& cannot %e used as a defense for noncompliance2 onism v Dualism  i) Dualism separate s.stems &here international la& must %e incorporated into municipal la& to the e3tent that it is consistent &ith constitution ii) onism single s.stem &here international la& is higher than municipal la& in hierarch. of legal norms B.International Law as U.S. Law (customar.)# Seen as federal uestion (treaties) or federal common la& (customar. international la&) i) -onstitution gives -ongress po&er to define and punish offenses against the la& of nations ii) ;ederal government is %etter decider than individual states and Supreme -ourt is final authorit. iii) President might %e a%le to disregard international la& under the -onstitutiona)!3ecutive <ranch receives great &eightdeference and situations ma. lead to “ controlling e3ecutive acts ”  or political uestions2 -ustomar. international la& realisticall. su%@ect to -onstitution and other legislation, even if it shouldn ’ t %e i) $elationship &ith treaties is according to 4ast in 8ime rule1 +ct of State doctrine is domestic rule of @udicial selfrestraint to not @udge another state ’ s acts in its o&n territor. i) $ationale is to leave foreign affairs for !3ecutive %ranch (  /an#o a#ional &e uba v. Sabbatino  -u%a nationali:ed companies in retaliation and possi%l. violation of international la&) ii) an. e3ceptions unrecogni:ed government, treaties, unam%iguous customar. principles, counterclaims, e3traterritorial act, private acts, %ri%er., human rights issues iii) Second Hickenlooper +mendment presumption that doctrine doesn ’ t appl. if act is a violation of international la& unless !3ecutive <ranch intervenes C.Incor%oration o& Treaties into U.S. Law # 8reaties made %. President under -onstitutionB no reuirement of consent %. individual states i) Senate gives consent not ratification (technical term)B limits scope of consent, and not reservations2 8reaties are su%@ect to -onstitutional limitations i) ;ederalism means treaties can override transitor. state interests for a national interest (  0issouri v.  Hollan&   igrator. <ird 8reat. act limited hunting)a)$ationale collective %argaining %. central gov ’ tB local governments should not make treaties %)4ook at “ invisi%le radiations ”  from the #0 th  +mendment ii) Scope not limited %. -ongressional po&er, onl. %. issues regarding separation of po&ers1 *onselfe3ecuting treaties must still %e e3ecuted %. legislature (  Foster 1 2lam v. eilson  land grants must  %e confirmed %. -ongress) i) Selfe3ecuting treaties o%ligations to refrain from actingB presumption against defaulting on o%ligations ii)  *onselfe3ecuting infringements on e3clusive -ongressional po&ers (mone.)B criminal penalties must have due processB trend ma. %e to presume nonselfe3ecutionB usuall. no private rights of action iii) Determination is solel. %. the /nited Statesa)4ook to intentions of President-ongress –  did the. intend domestic courts to enforce treat.? %)Polic. reasons allo& for more democratic process &ith House v stick to -onstitution? 4astintime rule applies for later statutes or treaties that are inconsistentB ho&ever, treat. o%ligations remain ( $hitney v. 3obertson  treat. limiting duties from Dom $ep &as not relevant to trade &ith Ha&aii) i) Aienna -onvention on -onsular $elations doesn ’ t provide foreign state &ith private right of action and allo&s for procedural rules of forum state to govern implementation (  /rear& v. *reene4 Para. v. *ilmore  /S failed to inform E of his right to notif. consulate, %ut E procedurall. defaulted on his claim %ecause of +!DP+ that &as passed after -onvention)a)Supreme -ourt cannot enforce 5- orders7 harming /etsy  canon that statutes should %e construed to avoid violating the la& of nations 6 8ermination of treaties must %e done %. !3ecutive %ranch ( harlton v. 5elly  violation of treat. %. other nations doesn ’ t automaticall. void the treat. %ecause it is a political decision) D.Ot*er A+ree ents # -ongressional!3ecutive +greements –  most are approved %. -ongress e3 anteB not -onstitutional %ut assures e3ecution and involvement %. %oth House and Senate2 Sole !3ecutive +greements –  !3ecutive has po&er to conduct foreign relations, %ut -ase +ct reuires  presentation of agreements to -ongress i) 5nternational -ompacts cannot %e overruled %. state la&s ( !S v. /elmont   *ationali:ation of claims o&ed  %. $ussia)a)!3ecutive has po&er to recogni:e nations and create relevant polic. ( !.S. v. Pin6  ) ii) Selfe3ecutingB also follo&s 4astin8ime rule  E.Terroris Cases # +8S is a @urisdictional statute that onl. allo&s private right of action for violations of safe conduct, actions against am%assadors, and pirac. +n. ne& right of action must %e determined &ith great caution given ne& role of common la& and limited role of courts -ustomar. international la& does not support private right for ar%itrar. arrest ( Sosa v. %lvare70a#hain ) i) $ationale of incorporating int ’ l la& into municipal la& dut. to uphold %inding la&s, valua%le norms, signaling2 -iti:endetainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enem. com%atant must receive notice of the factual %asis for his classification, and a fair opportunit. to re%ut the Gov ’ t ’ s factual assertion %efore a neutral decisionmaker /S authori:ed to detain citi:ens %. +/; during time of active hostilities for preventative detention, so *onDetainee +ct doesn ’ t appl. Due Process reuires  0atthew  %alancing test (  Ham&i v.  3umsel&  ) i) 4a&s of &ar and Geneva -onvention used as a limit of e3ecutive po&er  ii) ilitar. 8ri%unal allo&ed to decide status as enem. com%atant +/; allo&s militar. commissions, Geneva -onvention has no private right of action and does not appl. to +l aeda, militar. has @urisdiction, /- doesn ’ t appl., and tri%unal is competent (  Ham&an v. 3umsel&  )1 Ha%eas petitions allo&ed for detainees at Guantanamo since it operates on custodian and %ase is under  plenar. and e3clusive @urisdiction of /S (  3asul v. /ush ) I,.L A!   O  T REATIES A.De&inition # Aienna -onvention on 4a& of 8reaties as authoritative guide although not ratified %. /S i) -overs &ritten agreements %et&een statesB nonretroactiveB mostl. regarded as customar. int ’ l la& ii) /S had reservations to +rticle 6 &hich &ould allo& President to enter treaties &ithout Senate approval2 8reat. must %ind t&o or more su%@ects of international la& and governed %. international la& (produce legal effects or o%ligations) in its formation and e3ecutionB look at intention of parties i) !3press statement needed to rel. on private la&1 /nilateral acts can also lead to o%ligations (  2astern *reenlan& ( or. v. +en.) B   u#lear Tests ase (%us. 1   .8. v. Fra.)  look at goodfaith intention of state even &ithout reaction from other states) i) Dependent on factual circumstances and availa%le alternatives (  Frontier +ispute ase (/.F. v. 0ali) ) ii) Difference from contracts *o reuirement of consideration  *on%inding agreements are declining –  still ma. create e3pectations of compliance, politicalmoral o%ligation i) a. %e used for political reasons or to avoid the ratification process B.Reservations # /nilateral statement e3cluding or modif.ing legal effect of certain treat. provisions2 <alance state sovereignt. and consent v integrit. and purpose of the treat. (  3eservations to the onvention on *eno#i&e  intent for as man. states to @oin as possi%le) i) Permissi%ilit. 4ook to the compati%ilit. of the reservation &ith the o%@ectpurpose of the -onvention ii) States @udge compati%ilit. for themselves to see if reserving part. is still %ound %. the -onvention iii) 'pposa%ilit. polic. decision on a permissi%le reservation1 $eservations ma. not %e allo&ed, %ut onl. declarations (/ * -onvention on the 4a& of the Sea) $eservations rare e3cept in human rights treaties i) Human $ights -ommittee &ill decide compati%ilit. since states have no vested interest in doing so C.O-servance #  Pa#ta sunt servan&a  and good faith to perform and reali:e purpose of treat.2 -onstitutional la& can onl. %e invoked if consent &as in violation of constitution D.Inter%retation # /nilateral interpretation is not %inding on other parties (  9esse Lewis laim (!S v. */)  8ri%unal can determine if purchasing fresh %ait &as violation of treat.) i) 5nterpretations should %e contested to avoid acuiescence ii) +uthentic interpretations might %e amendments or additional clauses2 Travau preparatoires  is supplementar. %ut looked at simultaneousl. &ith ordinar. meaning taken in conte3t of o%@ectpurposeetc i)2n#ir#lement progressi   process of interpretation &ill onl. use intentions for special meanings ii) Su%seuent conduct ma. %e more relia%le than preparator. &ork, %ut it must %e kno&n to all parties and  %. a competent part. ( ase on#erning 5asi6ili,Se&u&u Islan&  )
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