Documents

Turns

Categories
Published
of 6
All materials on our website are shared by users. If you have any questions about copyright issues, please report us to resolve them. We are always happy to assist you.
Related Documents
Share
Description
Some Turns
Transcript
  1AR cards Multipolarity is coming now---economy, competitiveness, soft power deficit, and international power structures Clark, Ph.D International Politics, 11   Ian,   E H Carr Professor in International Politics, elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1999, and has served as its Chair of Posts since 2005, “China and the United States: a succession of hegemonies?”, International Affairs, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2011/87_1clark.pdf Approaching the subject from a different direction, others now believe that the conditions for any primacy of this kind   have already receded, in consequence of a relative shift in material power .  57 This assessment has received some oblique endorsement in President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy , which described ‘a dynamic international environment, in which different nations are exerting greater influence ’ and ‘emerging powers in every region of the world are increasingly asserting themselves’ . 58 Official   US projections up to 2025 paint a broadly similar picture. These   highlight the trend towards multipolarity,  associated with a greater diffusion of power internationally . 59 One major reason for the prevalence of this assessment is the aftermath of the global financial turmoil  of 2007  – 2009: its negative impact on the US   economy, its squeeze on the role of the dollar , its damage to the American model of   capitalism , and its seeming acceleration of a shift in the centre of the global economy   towards East Asia . Domestically, US opinion is increasingly inward-looking , while its stalemated political system has rendered it less disposed to bear the responsibilities of international leadership.  Accordingly, much discussion has been framed by an image of declining US power, set against the seemingly remorseless rise of China (and Asia more generally), indicating the likelihood of a significant power transition.  60 This image is considered particularly applicable in the economic sphere, given China’s rapid emergence from the effects of the global recession, relative to the ongoing travails of the United States . There are many claims that East Asia now forms the powerhouse of the global economy, and that China is acquiring a much louder voice t hrough the G20, while possibly applying pressure against the role of the US dollar as the principal global reserve currency. 61 At the same time, much of China’s trade balance ha s been recycled into US government securities, so that at the onset of the global financial turmoil in summer 2008 China had the largest holding of such securities, amounting to some US$967 billion. 62 In total, China owned US$1.5 trillion in dollar-denomi nated debt by March 2009. 63 While this is often presented as an important form of China’s leverage, it can be understood als o as evidence of continuing US structural power. 64 At the same time, the United States has become one of China’s largest trading partners. 65 This has been a double-edged sword politically, creating high levels of interdependence, while also aggravating economic imbalances. 66 In 2007 the US experienced a trade deficit with China of US$256 billion, its largest with any partner (and representing two-thirds of the US deficit overall), and this has spilled over into ongoing controversies about the low value of the Chinese currency. 67 More troubling still,   important elements   of traditional US soft power, such as its cultural and ideological appeal at the centre of free- market philosophy, and as the world’s technological leader,   may no longer evoke quite the   positive response that they did during the second half of the twentieth century .  68 For yet others, the problem is more deep-seated still, in that   we have moved into an age when it would be unrealistic to expect any state to be able to function as a global leader . On this reasoning, ‘American hegemony has set in motion a world that can no longer be dominated by any single state or its cultural fruits’ . 69 To this extent,   any future US role is already a victim of its own past successes: it has helped shape a world that is no longer amenable to hegemonic direction . 70 Already,   Mandelbaum’s  earlier depiction of the United States as a Goliat h functioning as ‘the world’s government’ must seem quite fanciful.  7  Unipolarity and hegemony are collapsing---Brooks, Wohlforth, and Kagan are all wrong Pape, Ph.D Political Science, 9  Robert A. Paper, Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.  AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline.  The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq  War, growing government   debt , increasingly negative current- account balances and other  internal economic weaknesses  have cost the United States real power   in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue,  we will   look back at  the Bush  administration years as the death knell for  American hegemony  . Since the cold war, the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments, seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood — the Americas — but also in Europe and Asia, along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources, but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. The Bush administration has not just continued Ameri ca’s traditional grand strategy, but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time — waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Ru ssia itself. For nearly two decades, those convinced of U.S. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others, virtually discounting the possibility that Germany, France, Russia, China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer  and Niall Ferguson  to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert   Kagan , even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth   and  Stephen Brooks, all believe the principal feature  of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable   dominance of American power . The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar- dominance school’s world, but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. This   is simply no longer realistic . For the past eight years, our policies have been based on these flawed arguments, while   the ultimate foundation of American power — the relative   superiority of the U.S. economy in the world — has been in decline since early on in the Bush   administration . There is also good reason to think that, without deliberate action, the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. To be sure, the period of U.S. relative decline has been, thus far, fairly short. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate, if not rectify, further decline in the foreseeable future. Still, America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U.S. grand st rategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda ’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan, Iran ’s continued nuclear program and Russia ’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues, solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world . Most important,  America’s     declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an   end,  that major powers will increasingly have the strength to    balance against U.S. policies  they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before, our own hubris may be our downfall. Retrenchment is key to avoiding great power war Monteiro 12  Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40 From the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the Gold ilocks tale, “just right.”116 In fact,   each strategic option available to the unipole   produces significant conflict . Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conflict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the   significant level of   conflict  the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power   remains preponderant . From the narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy   .   A unipolar structure provides   no incentives for conflict involving a disengaged   unipole . Disengagement would   extricate the unipole’s  forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and   decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation . There is, however, a downside. Disengagement would  lead to heightened conflict beyond the unipole’s region and increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conflicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows conflict between others to fester. In a sense, then, strategies of   defensive and offensive dominance are   self-defeating . They create incentives for recalcitrant   minor powers  to bolster their capabilities  and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war in order to thwart them.   This will   either drag U.S. forces into numerous   conflicts   or   result in an increasing number of major powers . In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will be constrained.117 This last point highlights one of the crucial issues  where Wohlforth and I differ —the benefits of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole , I predict that states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole.  To the contrary, these   minor powers will   become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance , displaying the     limited pacifying effects of U.S. power . What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole?   What can a unipole do that a great power in  bipolarity or   multipolarity cannot?  My argument hints at the possibility that — at least in the security realm — unipolarity does   not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes .118 If unipolarity  provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “   have within it the seeds  if not of its own destruction , then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “*t+his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120  At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system. Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By putting other states in extreme self  -help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint , other states  will develop  their capabilities, including nuclear   weapons — restraining it all the same .122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily   lead to greater influence  and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint .  2AR US will accept its new role peacefully  –  no backlash Charles A.   Kupchan   Fall 99   World Policy Journal Life after pax Americana   The bad news is that the global stability that unipolarity has engendered will be jeopardized as power becomes more equally   distributed in the international system . The good news is that this structural change  will occur through different mechanisms than in the past, and therefore   may be easier to manage peacefully . The rising challenger is Europe, not a unitary state with hegemonic ambitions. Europe's aspirations will be moderated by the self-checking mechanisms inherent in the EU and by cultural and linguistic barriers to centralization. In addition, the United Statesis likely to react to a more independent Europe by stepping back and making room for an EU that appears ready to be more self-reliant and more muscular.   Unlike reigning hegemons in the   past, the United States will not fight to the finish to maintain its primacy and prevent its eclipse by a rising challenger. On the contrary,   the United States will cede leadership   willingly as its economy slows and it grows weary of being the security guarantor of last   resort. The prospect is thus not one of clashing titans, but of no titans at all . Regions long accustomed to relying on American resourcesand leadership to preserve the peace may well be left to fend for themselves. These are the main reasons that the challenge for American grand strategy as the next century opens will be to wean Europe and East Asia of their dependence on the United States andput in place arrangements that will prevent the return of competitive balancing and regional rivalries in the wake of an American retrenchment. Attempting to preserve hegemony only exacerbates the effects of collapse Robert A.     Pape 9 , Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.   The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United   States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the   collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously . Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond,   China and Russia, along with any one of the   other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military   opposition  at least as serious as did the Soviet Union  during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance.   Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline.  Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk   international opposition that poses far greater costs and far   greater dangers . A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state’s economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-term decline — we should learn from history . Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of preventive war —or lesser measures to “merely” firmly contain a rising power — has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that “the first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the pro blem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war.” Yet,   waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of   the great losing strategies in history . The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use war to improve

Crude Oil 11

Jul 23, 2017
We Need Your Support
Thank you for visiting our website and your interest in our free products and services. We are nonprofit website to share and download documents. To the running of this website, we need your help to support us.

Thanks to everyone for your continued support.

No, Thanks