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THE RETURN OF THE OBSOLESCING BARGAIN AND THE DECLINE OF 'BIG OIL': A STUDY OF BARGAINING IN THE CONTEMPORARY OIL INDUSTRY

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THE RETURN OF THE OBSOLESCING BARGAIN AND THE DECLINE OF 'BIG OIL': A STUDY OF BARGAINING IN THE CONTEMPORARY OIL INDUSTRY
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  1 CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures 3 Acknowledgements 5 PART 1: FRAMEWORK   Introduction 7 Chapter 1: Empirical Framework  9Introduction 91. Oil: Politicisation and Bargaining 112. The Characteristics of the Contemporary Oil Industry 14Major Actors: Characteristics and Interests 14 The Contemporary Oil Industry: FromCooperation to Conflict 27Conclusion: Empirical Conundrums 32 Chapter 2: Extant Literature and Hypotheses 34Introduction 341. Host State-MNC Bargaining 352. Home State-MNC Relations 463. The Rise of China and the New Age of Energy Security 534. Issue Linkage 56Conclusion 58 PART 2: CASE STUDIES 61Case Selection and Methodology 61 Chapter 3: Russia 64Case Study 1: Vladimir Putin and the Oil Industry   –  From ‗Bandit Capitalism‘ to ‗Statist Capitalism‘ 69Case Study 2: Pipeline Bargaining   –    ‗The Scramble for Siberia‘ 80 Chapter 4: Venezuela 97Case Study 3: Oil Industry Bargaining in Venezuela  –    ‗The   End of the Royalty Holiday‘ 102 Chapter 5: The United States 118Case Study 4: Bargaining for UNOCAL  –  The Rise of Neo-Mercantilism 122Case Study 5: Bargaining for the Future of ANWR   –  Oil versusEnvironment 131 Chapter 6: Iran 142Case Study 6: Oil Industry and Nuclear Bargaining inIran  –    ‗Using    Oil as a Shield‘ 150 PART 3: CONCLUSIONS 178 Chapter 7: Discussion of Findings 179Introduction 179  2 Hypotheses Revisited 181Conclusion 200 Chapter 8: Contributions to Literature, Policy Implications, andHeuristic Value 201Introduction 2011. The Original Contribution to Knowledge 2032. Policy Implications 2123. Heuristic Value for Further Research 213Conclusion 213  Appendices 2151. Selection of the IOC-Host State Bargaining Model Variables 2152.  Timeline of Russia‘s Domestic Oil Barg  aining 2243. Timeline of Oil Pipeline Bargaining between Russia,China and Japan 2264. Timeline of Oil Industry Bargaining in Venezuela 2285. Timeline of Bargaining for UNOCAL 2316. Timeline of Bargaining for the Future of ANWR 2327. Timeline of Oil Industry and Nuclear Bargaining in Iran 2348. Measurement of the IOC-Host State Bargaining Model Variables 2379. Acronyms and Abbreviations 251 Bibliography 254  3 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES  Tables 1.1 Net Oil Exporters and Importers (2005) 151.2 OPEC, OECD, and non-OPEC Oil Reserves, R/P Ratio andProduction (2005) 151.3 Increasing Net Oil Imports in the OECD, US and China 191.4 Major IOCs‘ Crude Oil and Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) Reserves (2002 -2005) 303.1 Russian Crude Oil Production and Consumption (1985-2005) 663.2 Goals of Main Actors in Russian Oil Industry Bargaining 693.3 Main Russian Oil Companies and Their Ownership, Reserves andProduction (2005) 743.4 Goals of Main Actors in Russian Pipeline Bargaining 803.5 China‘s Crude Oil Production and Consumption (1992-2005) 923.6 Chinese, Japanese and American Oil Imports by Region of Origin (2005) 923.7  Japan‘s Crude O il Consumption (1996  –  2005) 943.8 Factors Favouring ―China‖ and ―Japan‖ Pipeline Route 954.1  Venezuela‘s Crude Oil Production and Consumption (Selected Years  and 1998-2005) 1014.2 Goals of Main Actors in Oil Industry Bargaining in Venezuela 1045.1 The U.S. Crude Oil Production and Consumption (Selected Yearsand 1995-2005) 1215.2 Goals of Main Actors in Bargaining for UNOCAL 1225.3 Goals of Main Actors in Bargaining for the Future of ANWR 1316.1 Iran‘s Crude Oil Production and Consumption (Selected Years and  1994-2005) 1466.2 Goals of Main Actors in Oil Industry and Nuclear Bargaining in Iran 1526.3 Iran‘s O il Exports to Europe (2001-2005) 1726.4 Iran‘s Oil Exp orts to Asia (2004 and 2005) 1747.1 Influence of Various Variables on Host States‘ Increase in Bargaining   Power vis-à-vis IOCs between 1998/99 and 2005/06 1877.2 Major IOCs‘ and Chinese NOCs‘ Oil Reserves (2004 and 2005) 1947.3 Major IOCs‘ and Chinese NOCs‘ R/P Ratios (2004 and 2005) 194 A8-1 The Total and Individual Variable Score for Iran, Russia, and Venezuela(1998/99 and 2005/06) 248 A8-2 The Overall Differen ce Between Host States‘ Bargaining Power   vis-à-  vis IOCs‘ (1998/99 and 2005/06; Average for Iran, Russia, and   Venezuela) 249 Figures 2.1 Exit, Voice and Loyalty in IOC-Host State Bargaining 412.2 IOCs‘ Ex it and Voice Potential Matrix 422.3 IOC-Specific Resources, and Industry and Country Context as Determinants of IOCs‘ Bargaining Power 442.4 Bargaining Outcome as a Function of IOCs‘ Relative Bargaining Power  (Prediction) 452.5 U.S. Government‘s Support for Ameri can IOCs as a Function of TheirInterests (Prediction) 522.6  American IOCs‘ Bargaining Success as a Function of the U.S. Government    4 Support (Prediction) 522.7 IOCs‘ Bargaining Power Relative to Bargaining Power of China‘s NOCs  (Prediction) 542.8 Oil- importing Government‘s Bargaining Success as a Function of Oil  Supply Security Threat Perception (Prediction) 552.9 Concessions as a Function of Oil- exporting States‘ Use of Oil as a  Bargaining Tool (Prediction) 583.1 Russia‘s Crude Oil Producti on and Consumption (1985-2005) 673.2 Chinese and Japanese Pipeline Proposals 824.1  Venezuela‘s Crude Oil Production and Consumption (1965-2005) 1026.1 Iran‘s Crude Oil Production a nd Consumption (1966 - 2005) 1467.1 IOCs‘ Exit and Voice Potential Matrix in Iran, Russia, and Venezuela 1827.2 Relative Bargaining Power between Iran, Venezuela and Russia, and IOCs(1998/99 and 2005/06) 1837.3 Bargaining Outcome in Iran, Russia, and Venezuela as a Function of  IOCs‘ Relative Bargai ning Power (1990s and 2000s) 1867.4 U.S. Government‘s Support for American IOCs as a Function of Their  Interests 1907.5  American IOCs‘ Bargaining Success as a Function of the U.S.  Government Support 1917.6 IOCs‘ Bargaining Power Relative to Bargaining Power of China‘s NOCs 1957.7 Oil- importing Government‘s Bargaining Success as a Function of Oil  Supply Security Threat Perception 1977.8 Concessions as a Function of Oil-exporti ng States‘ Use of Oil as a  Bargaining Tool 2008.1 Possible Matrix of Host Governments‘ Exit and Voice Potential from  Global Economic System 213 A8-1 Relative Bargaining Power between Iran and IOCs (Individual Variables;1998/99 and 2005/06) 249 A8-2 Relative Bargaining Power between Venezuela and IOCs (Individual Variables; 1998/99 and 2005/06) 250 A8-3 Relative Bargaining Power between Russia and IOCs (Individual Variables; 1998/99 and 2005/06) 250  5  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I would like to thank my parents, Darko and Lili Vivoda, and my grandma, Ljiljana Vivoda, for their moral and financial support throughout the preparation of this book.Moreover, lengthy telephone discussions with my dad and his wholehearted help with getting  hold of a lot of relevant literature were very important. My mum‘s encouragement and supportover the phone also played an important role throughout the research and writing of this book.I would like to thank Richard Leaver, for his intellectual guidance, inspiration, friendship, andsupport. Richard, a great expert on oil, was always there for me if I had any questions. My accessto his comprehensive private library provided me with countless old and new books on oil andon bargaining. His help in providing me with casual tutoring, marking, and lecturing opportunities, which later brought all too important additional funding, is also highly appreciated.  A big thank you goes to James Manicom, Alex Stephens, and Terry O‘Calla ghan forproofreading previous drafts, and offering me invaluable advice. Moreover, James, our countlesschats over coffee were very helpful, and so were numerous articles and links that you sent me viae-mail. Thanks mate!My thanks also go to the CEO of  my father‘s company, Endika Aboitiz, for financial help.   This help came at a very important time, when I was facing financial hardship. I also thank JohnFitzpatrick for excellent advice regarding my theoretical framework. His thoughtful suggestionsand explanations are highly appreciated.I would also like to thank various academic and administrative staff at the School of Politics and International Studies (SPIS) at Flinders for attending my SPIS seminars andproviding valuable comments; offering vital casual employment; and great administrative support. My particular thanks goes to Andrew O‘Neil, but also to Haydon Manning, MaryanneKelton, Peter Burns, Julie Tonkin, Sonja Yates, and Justin De Rosa.I thank various individuals, who sent me their work, and/or offered their invaluable advice andopinion, or have shown general interest about my work   –  Gerry Groot, Purnendra Jain, SimonBromley, Steffen Hertog, Valérie Marcel, Jakob Mark, Ivor Williams, and Christer Jönsson.
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