United States- DPRK Relations Is Normalization Possible?

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  A Report o the CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM United States- DPRK Relations  Is Normalization Possible? OCTOBER 2019 PREFACE   Jeffrey Mankoff  AUTHOR Anastasia Barannikova  United States- DPRK Relations  Is Normalization Possible? PREFACE Jeffrey Mankoff  AUTHOR Anastasia Barannikova OCTOBER 2019 A Report o the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program  United States-DPRK Relations: Is Normalization Possible | II  About CSIS Established in Washington, D.C., over 50 years ago, the Center or Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to providing strategic in sights and policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world.In late 2015, Tomas J. Pritzker was named chairman o the CSIS Board o rustees. Mr. Pritzker succeeded ormer U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), who chaired the CSIS Board o rustees rom 1999 to 2015. CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chie executive officer since 2000.Founded in 1962 by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS is one o the  world’s preeminent international policy in stitutions ocused on deense and security; regional study; and transnational challenges ranging rom energy and trade to global development and economic integration. For eight consecutive years, CSIS has been named the world’s number one think tank or deense and national security by the University o Pennsylvania’s “Go o Tink ank Index.”Te Center’s over 220 ull-time staff and large network o affiliated schol ars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look to the uture and anticipate change. CSIS is regularly called upon by Congress, the executive branch, the media, and others to explain the day’s events and offer bipartisan recommendations to improve U.S. strategy.CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those o the author(s). © 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Tis report is made possible by the generous support o Carnegie Corporation o New York. Te statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility o the author.Center or Strategic & International Studies1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW  Washington, D.C. 20036202-887-0200 |  Anastasia Barannikova | III Contents Preace IV Introduction: Why Dialogue Must Continue 11 | Possible Consequences o Ending U.S.-North Korea Dialogue 22 | Benefits o Continued Dialogue 143 | Regional Actors’ Positions on the U.S.-DPRK 204 | Ostensible and Real Goals o the Parties to the Dialogue 265 | Nuclear Weapons and North Korea’s Strategic Goals 366 | Dialogue Formats 427 | Russian Position on the Korean Nuclear Problem 488 | Conclusions and Recommendations 52 About the Author 55  United States-DPRK Relations: Is Normalization Possible | IV Preace For decades, North Korea has posed one o American diplomacy’s most intractable challenges. Despite international isolation, multiple rounds o UN Security Council sanctions, the collapse or transormation o its ormer Communist patrons, and economic calamity, the government in Pyongyang—now on its third generation o Kims—has proven remarkably resilient. It has one o Asia’s largest armies and nuclear and missile capabilities that hold its closest neighbors at risk, and is on the threshold o developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable o striking the United States. Multiple U.S. administrations have sought to orce Pyongyang to abandon these weapons programs, primarily by escalating economic and military pressure. Neither pressure nor diplomacy, such as the now-abandoned Six Party alks, has had much success. In this new report, Dr. Anastasia Barannikova, a Research Fellow at Adm. Nevelskoy Maritime State University in Vladivostok, Russia and a visiting ellow with the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program rom January-May 2019, proposes a radically different approach. Based on her analysis o North Korea’s own strategic objectives, Barannikova suggests that  Washington renew its efforts at bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang without preconditions, accept the Kim regime as a legitimate actor, and build relations with it as a means o tilting the overall balance o power in East Asia in its avor.Tis approach is at odds with what or decades has been conventional wisdom in  Washington. It would require the U.S. to undamentally rethink how it manages deterrence and non-prolieration, and downplay considerations about North Korea’s abysmal human rights situation. For those reasons, it is likely to generate strong objections in many quarters.  Yet with America’s North Korea strategy at a dead end, Barannikova is surely right that it is time to re-think basic assumptions underpinning that strategy. As a Korea expert with a deep knowledge o North Korean political dynamics and strategic culture, as well as an outsider to Washington’s endless arguments about dealing with Pyongyang, Barannikova brings a resh approach to a problem that has bedeviled U.S. policy makers or decades. We hope that her report will jump-start a much-needed conversation about how to deal with  what may be the most dangerous flashpoint on earth. JEFFREY MANKOFF Senior Fellow, CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program
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